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Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy
For the Doctor-Patient Relationship
Widespread criticism of current medical practice suggests that the
technical benefits of modern medical science' have been offset by the
disintegration of personalized relationships between doctors and pa-
tients. When the practice of medicine was dominated by the general
practitioner with firm roots in his community, the physician managed
his patients with authoritarian control. However, the doctor's practice
was based on his direct knowledge of the patient as a person living
within the context of family and neighborhood. This knowledge tem-
pered the physician's authoritarianism by giving him the opportunity
to make personalized, though technical, decisions and to inspire moti-
vation for therapy in his patients.
In recent decades, the rapid rise of population and the changes in
medical technology have dislocated the traditional medical world;
the modem physician still exercises authoritarian control, but often
without the personal knowledge of the patient that was possessed by
the practitioner. Thus the decisions of the modem physician are often
technical strategies keyed solely to the physical indices of his patient's
body. The contemporary doctor often treats his patient as an ob-
ject, which works to the distress of the patient's feelings, motivation
and health. This disturbing trend has been documented in recent
studies of physicians and patients. -
The patient who today suffers from authoritarian, depersonalized
medicine will continue to do so as long as physicians refuse to acknowl-
edge the harmful effects of a doctor-patient relationship which is not
based on mutual exchange of information. 3 Reform of medical educa-
1. Medical progress in the past fifty years has been astounding. For a general descrip-
tion of the impact of scientific research on medical practice see PATIeNTs, Pzuszicxs AND
ILLNSS (E. Jaco ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as JAco] and M. Cpicnro.,, Fivn PA-m s
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CRXcHToN]. In the past fifty years, life expectancy in America
has increased by one-third. Bloom, Some Implications of Studies in the Professionaltat ion
of the Physician, in JAco 313, 315.
2. See pp. 1546-50 and notes 37-48 infra.
3. Authoritarianism, whether or not based on personal knowledge, is beginning to be
criticized. Authoritarian control by doctors of their patients, especially in a hospital set-
ing, is characterized by the doctor's domination over every decision made about the
patient. The doctor may control every aspect of the patient's life. Recently, patients have
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tion cannot recreate the general practitioner, and changes in law can-
not bring back personalized doctor-patient relationships. But the law
of informed consent could be restructured so as to compel the doctor
to share critical decision-making power with the patient and to encour-
age the development of a partnership mode in doctor-patient relations
to replace the prevalent authoritarian pattern. The doctor's acceptance
of the patient as an active decision-maker in a partnership will in turn
reintroduce a measure of "personalization" in technical decisions made
in the modern medical context and may well stimulate more effectively
the patient's motivation to accept treatment.
The law today nominally asserts that the patient is a decision-maker,
with the right to decide what will happen to his body. But this right
is substantially vitiated by application of the professional standard of
care in informed consent litigation. The medical profession and, more
been viewed as a subjugated group, with attention focused on the mentally III,
The great social movements of our time concern the demand for full participation
as equals in the affairs of the community by the disadvantaged. Sermons and speeches
have long acknowledged the justice of this demand, but the Insistence that we tako
the democratic ideology seriously and live by it is revolutionary. All of us may be
viewed in some context as disadvantaged. Two prominent examples are Negroes and
women; two groups less aware of being deprived are students and patients,
Conventional psychiatric institutions reinforce the self-image of the hospitalized
as losers, sufferers, and victims. Decisions about fundamental and pressing issues In
the lives of patients are decided by others; the individuals most concerned partic-
ipate not at all. In an authoritarian hospital, the roles of doctors, nurses, and pa.
ients are dearly defined. The "good patient" is compliant, cooperative, accepting,
unquestioning, the recipient of the good, established, known care from doctors, nurges,
and other staff members. He is regarded as a trouble-maker, uncooperative, anti
cantankerous if he questions procedures, seeks information about why this Is being
done and that isn't, or presumes to take a more active position by volunteeringjudgments about what is wrong with him and what should be done, or the nature
of the difficulties and the treatment of other patients. One part of the hospital-the
staff-does things to that other part of the hospital-the patients.- "to get 'them'
well." The patients comply with these implicit expectations by assuming the pas-
sive role of those to whom things are done by others.
Once more, society and the doctors, experts with extraordinary authority over the
lives of others, justify such exemptions from democratic practices and drastic usurpa.
tion of rights by describing the mentally ill as fragile, childlike, Irresponsible, and
dangerous to themselves and others. Not protecting them, failing to administer their
affairs as dependents, would be a breach of professional obligation. But now the
Possibility is being considered that the traditional medical model is not appropriate
or reprocessing these defeated and disadvantaged, and new institutions specilically
elaborated in response to their needs are developing.
R. RUaENTEIN & H. LASSwELL, THE SHARING OF POWER IN A PsYciIATRIc HoSPTAL 2-6
(1966).
Thomas Szasz, a psychiatrist, suggests that attitudes of "kindness" and "sweetness" for
the "poor patient" serve the purpose of enhancing the doctors' self-esteem. Thle code of
slavery in the South demanded that the master treat his slave with "kindness" and "con-
sideration" in a maneuver to depreciate and subjugate the Negro. Szasz argues that "much
of what passes for 'medical ethics' is a set of rules the net effect of which is the persistent




surprisingly, most legal commentators are satisfied with this situation.4
This Note will suggest new rules for the law of informed consent
which, by abandoning the professional standard and by compelling
adequate disclosure of medical information, will effectively protect the
patient's right to participate in medical decisions and will provide the
foundation for a nonauthoritarian partnership between doctor and
patient required by the changed conditions of modem medicine.
I. A Diagnosis of the Ailing Doctor-Patient Relationship
A. The Traditional Doctor-Patient Relationship
The physician's power over the patient arose out of a cultural tradi-
tion in which the doctor is the help-givers and the patient is consigned
to a role of helplessness. 6 Their relationship has been described as sim-
4. Commentary on the law of informed consent is an "expanding field," as was noted
is one of the most recent contributions, Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Ther-
apy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970). Their article contains a comprehensive list of the
literature in the field, and should be consulted for further reference. See also Oppenheim.
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEv.-IMfn L. REv. 1249 (1962); Plante, An
Analysis of "Informed Consent," 86 FoRD. L. RE,. 639 (1968); Note, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CAxiF. L. REv. 1996 (1967); Note, Failure to Inform as Medical
Malpractice, 23 VAND. L. REv. 754 (1970); Case Note, 75 HImv. L. R., 1445 (1962).
Some of this literature reflects a concern with stricter enforcement of the patient's right
to participate in decisions. The law which most courts have promulgated has "inade-
quately protected the patient's right to self-determination," Note, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1401 (1967), or is "unsatisfactory," Case Note,
75 HARv. L. RExv. 1445, 1447 (1962). The current standard, "[instead of fostering trust and
confidence between physician and patient, .. . may have the opposite effect. By ignoring
the individual patient, it may foster distrust of the medical profession by the general
public." Comment, Valid Consent to Medical Treatment: Need the Patient Know?, 4 DuQ.
L. REv. 450, 458 (1966). In the 1968 supplement to TnE LAw oF ToRTs, Harper and James
review the law as it has been applied in a majority of jurisdictions and conclude tiat
the requirements for patients are "unwarranted abdication[s] of responsibility and of the
individual's right to make an informed choice, to the medical profession." 2 F. HARn &
F. JAmms, THE LAw OF ToRrs § 17.1 n.15 (Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as HAIrEn &
JA s Supp. 68]. And though he finds the use of the professional standard of care
desirable, another writer states that consideration of the cases "leaves the impression that
the doctors as defending litigants are in the more favorable position before the law,"
Comment, Physician and Patient: Some Problems of Consent, 2 WASh. LJ. 158, 170 (192).
Some of these authors have also proposed changes in the law, see note 71 infra.
5. "[.[]he rules prescribing a help-giving attitude toward the weak . . . derive from
the dominant religions of Western man. Judaism, and especially Christianity teach these
rules. They do so by means of myth, example, exhortation, and whenever posible by the
use of appropriate negative sanctions." SzAsz, supra note 3 at 183.
6. Like the infant's cry, the message "I am sick" is exceedingly effective in mobiliz-
ing others to some kind of helpful action. In accordance with this communicative
impact of sickness, physicians-following in the footsteps of their predecessors, the
clergy-have tended to define their occupation as a "calling." This implied that it
was not only the sick and helpless who were calling them, as indeed they were, but
God as well. The helpers would thus hasten to the side of the helpless (the sick
or disabled) and would minister to him to restore him to "health." This fort of
therapeutic attitude tends to define the role of the helpless or sick person in a com-
plementary manner, that is, as entitled to help, merely by virtue of being disabled.
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ilar to that of parent and child. The physician possesses expert knowl-
edge and technical competence. He has a specific rather than a general
parental function, since his expertise extends only to matters of health.8
His sole motivation is to promote the welfare of the patient, before all
of his personal interests. 9
Hence, if we do not help him (particularly if we could) we incur moral blame for
our failure.
Id. at 187.
The writings of Talcott Parsons provide us with the philosophical essence of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, the standard from which we can measure the deviations of reality.
See E. FRIEDSON, PATIENTS' VIEWS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 190 (1961) [hereinafter cited its
FmEDsoN]. Parsons' most complete discussion of the relationship is found in T. PARSONs,
THE SOCIAL SysrEz (1951) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL SYSTEM]. His analysis is implicit in
most writings about doctors and patients. See, e.g., Henderson, Physician and Patient as
a Social System, 212 N.E. J. MED. 819 (1935); Houston, The Doctor Himself as a Thera.
peutic Agent, 11 ANN. INT. MEn. 1416 (1938); Lederer, How the Sick View Their Wrorld,
in JAco 247; Parsons & Fox, Illness, Therapy and The Modern Urban Family, In JAco
234; and Stem, The Specialist and the General Practitioner, in JAco 352; Szasz & Hoilen.
der, A Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine: The Basic Models of The Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 97 ARCHIVES INT. MED. 585 (1956).
7. Medical practitioners both admit and vehemently insist on the importance of
the personal relationship, and the "bedside manner." The ideal situation includes a
mixture of friendliness, respect and deference, a degree of the parent-and-child or
priest-and-parishioner relation.
F. KN'IGHT, FR oZr AND REFORM 359 (1947). Thomas Szasz describes the cultural tradition
which validates this model: ". . . [t)his is the game usually played in childhood .. .
everyone of us as a weak and helpless child was cared for by adults. Without such help
we would not have survived to adulthood." T. SzAsz, supra note 3, at 183, See also Parsons
& Fox, supra note 6, at 235, and Szasz & Hollender, supra note 6, at 588.
[The patient] craves health, security, and self-esteem, yet illness or fear of illness has
made him anxious and dependent. In the medical interview with the physician ...
he wants release from psychological tension as much as from physical pain.
Stem, supra note 6, at 357.
8. Parsons explains this role characteristic with reference to its unarticulated function.
Medical practice involves the physician in private and intimate knowledge of IIls pa.
tient's body and affairs beyond the limits of disclosure in an ordinary relationship, By
carefully segregating his professional function from his daily life, the physician citab'
lishes his legitimate claim to this knowledge-its relevance to the health problem-alid
allays anxieties on the part of his patients.
For example one physician expressed a strong dislike of being asked for professional
advice on social occasions, e.g., the lady sitting next to him at dinner asking what
she should do about some illness of her child. His usual response was to ask her to
come to his office and discuss it ....
One of the most conspicuous cases of the operation of segregation is where a po.
tential sexual element enters in. For example a general practitioner whose office was
in his home, and who had no office nurse or dressing room, reported that lie habit-
ually stepped out of the office to allow a female patient to get ready for a physical
examination. When, as occasionally happened, the patient started to disrobe before
he had time to get out of the room, he found it definitely embarrassing, though
the same patient disrobed on the examining table did not embarrass him at all
SOCIAL SYsrri at 457.
9. Parsons concludes that motivation is not personally, but institutionally derlvcd-
It is quite true . . . that the medical man is expected to place the welfare of the
patient above his own self-interest, financial or otherwise. He is also explicitly de-
barred, in the code of medical ethics, from a whole series of practices which are
taken for granted as quite legitimate for the honest and upright businessman, such
as advertising, price-competition, refusing to take patients on the ground that they
are not good "credit risks," etc. Thus the physician is both debarred from a variety
of immediate opportunities for financial gain which are open to the businessman,
and is positively enjoined to promote the welfare of his patients. It is not these facts
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The patient is expected to assume a child's role.'0 He suffers from
pain which he does not understand, and his anxieties are aroused. He
is "incapacitated," excused from his normal functioning and, like a
child, becomes dependent on others to take care of him. In this state,
the patient is particularly vulnerable to many forms of exploitation.'
For help he turns to the physician. The physician's specificity of func-
tion and altruistic motivation legitimate his assumption of power over
the patient's treatment because the doctor is expected to resolve the
patient's problems in the best interests of the patient. This is the pre-
vailing standard of professional responsibility.'-
The medical profession is firmly committed to protecting the indi-
vidual practitioner's traditional control over his patient.' 3 By rules of
which are at issue, but the interpretation of their meaning for motiation and the
mechanisms of social control.
Id. at 472. Were the physician to ignore these ethics and to garner financial rewards from
a commercialized practice, he would quickly fall into disrepute with his colleagues. This
would affect his chances for hospital appointments and referrals and his position in the
informal medical community, undoubtedly to his financial detriment. Thus altruistic be-
havior is a direct function of self-interest.
In other words, the collectivity-orientation of the professional pattern has become
built into a set of institutionalized expectations of behavior and attitude.
[B]oth self-interested and "altruistic" elements of motivation have thereby be-
come channeled into the path of conformity with the expectations. Therefore the secin-
ing paradox is realized that it is to a physician's self-interest to act contrary to his
own self-interest-in an immediate situation, of course, not "in the long run."
Id. at 473.
10. This role is that of the passive, trusting and non-critical patient who accepts the
doctor's orders. One physician describes what the dominant doctor should expect front
his submissive patient:
If you are a good doctor, your patients trust you; and if you are going to be their
doctor, you had better trust them. You tell them to do something, and they do it
-which is a form of consent. I do not think you can tell a patient exactly the situa-
tion no matter how hard you try, unless he happens to be a physician or a scientist.
Remarks of David D. Rutstein, M.D., Harvard Medical School, PRocEmtiNGs oF THE CON-
FERENCE ON THE ETHIrcAL AsPECTS OF ExPERIMENTATION wiTs HULmAN SuBJEcTs 34 (1967),
conference sponsored by DAEDALus and the N.I.H. [hereinafter cited as DAEALus PrOCEFD-
INGs]. See also BLOOM, The Role of the Patient, in THE Docron AND His PATIENT 9S (1965),
and SociAL SysrFf at 437.
11. By exploitation is meant psychological manipulation of the patient to serve the
financial, emotional or nefarious ends of the exploiter. The patient is susceptible to being
gulled into bizarre therapeutic programs which are not instituted for his own best in-
terests.
12. The physician's domination over his relationship with his patients is typical of
the traditional standard of professional-client relations. Sociological writing has favored
the concept that the client is better served when the professional assumes power and
control over the problems he has been asked to solve. For a more complete discussion of
this concept see D. Rosenthal, Client Participation in Professional Decision: The Lau3er-
Client Relationship in Personal Injury Cases (unpublished thesis, 1970) in files of Prof. J.
Katz, Yale Law School); THE PROFESsIONs: ROLFs AND Rum.Es (%V. Moore and G. Rosen-
blum eds., 1970); PROF.SSmONAMzATION (H. Vollmer & D. Mills eds., 1966).
13. The concept of professional autonomy affects both lay opinion and judicial scru-
tiny of professional action.
Professionals, in contrast to members of other occupations, claim and are often ac-
corded complete autonomy in their work. Since they are presumed to be the only
judges of how good their work is, no layman or other outsider can make any judg-
ment of what they can do. If their activities are unsuccessful, only another profes-
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ethics, physicians do not treat each other's patients, and the patient is
forced to commit himself to a single doctor when his efforts to shop
around are thwarted.14 Regulation of standards of practice is firmly
vested in informal professional sanctions, inaccessible to lay control
because isolated from malpractice suits or even medical association dis-
ciplinary proceedings. 15
sional can say whether this was due to incompetence or to the inevitable workings
of nature or society by which even the most competent practitioner would have been
stymied. This image of the professional justifies his demand for complete autonomy
and his demand that the client give up his own judgment and responsibility, leaving
everything in the hands of the professional.
Becker, The Nature of a Profession, in EDUCATION FOr TM PROrrSSlONS 3839 (1962).
Only physicians have so far succeeded in obtaining complete freedom from lay scrutiny
through application of the professional standard in negligence cases, See 2 F, HARlt l
F. JAmEs, THE L.Aw OF ToRTs, § 17.1 at 969 (1956).
14. When patients seek and receive a second opinion without the knowledge or ap-
proval of their physician, this is considered unprofessional conduct on the part of the
second physician and underhanded behavior on the part of the patient. See D. Rosenthal,
supra note 12, citing K. WALKER, PATIENTs AND Docroas 120 (1957).
Talcott Parsons writes:
To the doctor's obligation to use his authority "responsibly" in the interest of the
patient, corresponds the patient's obligation faithfully to accept the implications of
the fact that he is "Dr. X's patient" and so long as he remains in that status must
"do his part" in the common enterprise. He is free, of course, to terminate the rela-
tionship at any time. But the essential point is the sharp line which tends to be
drawn between being X's patient, and no longer being in that position. In the ideal
type of commercial relationship one is not A's customer to the exclusion of other
sources of supply for the same needs.
SOCIAL SYsmr m at 465.
15. A certain jealous guarding of their independence from outsiders might be e-
pected from such a professional group, indeed they do tend to do so vis-h-vis the
state and, ideologically at least, vis-h-vis any other potential source of "lay control."
But perhaps the most conspicuous fact is that even their own professional associa-
tions do not play a really important part in the control of medical practice and Its
potential abuses through formal channels. It is true that medical associations do have
committees on ethics and disciplinary procedures. But it is exceedingly rare for cases
to be brought into that formal disciplinary procedure. Thus the well-known reluc.
tance of physicians . . . to resort to the formal disciplinary procedures of their own
associations, which do not involve "washing their dirty linen' before laymen.
It may ...be suggested that reliance on informal controls, even though greater
formalization would be more "logical," may have its functional significance. As one
physician put it, "Who is going to throw the first stone? We are all vulnerable. We
have all been in situations where what we did could be made to look very bad,"
Formalization inevitably gives a prominent role to "technicalities" of definition. It
always opens the door for the "clever lawyer" whether he be a District Attorney or
merely the "prosecutor" of the medical society's own Committee on Ethics. Undoubt.
edly a certain amount of abuse does "get by" in the present situation which "ought
not to" and would not in a well-run formal system of control. But it is at least pos.
sible that the strong reliance on informal controls helps to give the physician con-
fidence, and a certain daring in using risky though well-advised procedures, which
he would not be so ready to do in a more thoroughly bureaucratized situation.
SOCIAL SYsrEa at 470-71.
The "informal controls" refer to the effect which unprofessional conduct would have on
a physician's standing in his professional community. Doctors exercise control over the
system of hospital and staff appointments, patient referrals and community reputation
which vitally affect a single physician's practice. See id. at 472-73. A questionnaire di.




The personalized aspects of the physician's practice developed when
he treated patients at home and the hospital premises served the poor
and the dying. The doctor then met and usually cared for members
of the patient's family. He visited the home and expected to maintain
a life-long association with the community he served' 0 Professional
responsibility-the use of expert knowledge to arrive at a diagnosis and
institute a therapy of choice'T-was thus exercised with some familiar-
1. Is there a provision in your constitution and bylaws which specifies that dimci-
plinary action can be taken against a member for incompetence?
Yes-8; no-38; no answer-1.
2. If the answer to No. 1 is yes, what definite actions can be taken?
Removal from membership-8.
3. In the past five years has your judicial body disciplined anyone for incompetence?
Yes--7; no--38; no answer-i.
4. Have your state or county grievance committees heard any complaints based on
incompetence in the past five years?
Yes-20; no-26; does not know-l.
5. If the ansver to No. 4 is yes, what actions have been recommended?
Membership terminated---3; action pending-l; further training recommended-;
referred to boards of medical examiners-3; suspension--4; limitation of staff priv-
ileges-2; charges dropped-3; friendly interrogation by a councilor-l; probation
-1.
6. Does your state society generally believe that the question of incompetence should
be handled by the hospital staff? By the board of medical examiners?
By county or state society and hospital staff-3; local county control preferred-2;
no policy--3; hospital staff-18; grievance committee--I; board of medical exam-
iners--6; hospital state society, and board-5; do not know-8; state society-I.
It will be noted that the constitution and bylaws of 38 state medical tocietles do
not specify that disciplinary action can be taken against a member for incompetence.
In the states which do have such provisions ultimate disciplinary action ending in
removal from membership can be taken. In seven of these states medical societies'
judicial bodies have disciplined physicians for incompetence. Regarding state and
county grievance committees the answers are not entirely satisfactory, as frequently
the state secretary was not familiar with county society actions which had ended
on the local level, and in many cases complaints were heard by grievance committees
and were settled informally. It is also noteworthy that stern action such as expulsion
from the medical society or suspension was taken in only seven cases. The majority
of secretaries believe that the hospital staff either with or without the cooperation
of the state and county societies and the board of medical examiners should be re-
sponsible for disciplining the incompetent physician.
Derbyshire, What Should The Profession Do About The Incompetent Physidan?, 194
J.A.M.A. 1287, 1288 (1965).
16. Medical practitioners were "outsiders" to these communities, in that their &-ill
and knowledge originated outside the community's nucleus. But the gap between the
local and the outside world was not as broad as today, when there is "emerging an in-
creasingly sharp distinction between those who are supposed to know (and are therefore
responsible for speaking with authority and making decisions) and those who do not know
(and who are therefore responsible for submitting to others' decisions)." Fnmso. at
195-95.
17. While the definition of responsibility could include "concern for the patient's
total functioning-physical, psychological, social, economic, spiritual-it is often limited
to physical aspects." Katz, The Education of The Physician-Investigator, 98 DA.&us 480,
485 (1969). Katz also comments:
Becker and his associates, on the basis of detailed observatons of an entire medical
school class, have described the development of the "responsibility perspective."
They state that "basically the term [responsibility] refers to the archetypal feature
of medical practice: the physician who holds his patient's fate in his hands and on
whom the patient's life and death may depend.' While concern with his "fate"
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ity with the patient's total environment and with an understanding
of the patient's problems which grew out of extended personal con-
tact.'8 The physician's diagnoses took account of personal information
and problems to which he was privy, and in his choice and applica-
tion of treatment he responded to the patient's spectrum of needs. In
short, his decisions were more than technically correct.19
The doctor's personal "art" of medicine also developed when lie
practiced in the context of the patient's home-life and community. It
has long been recognized that the personal confrontations between doc-
tor and patient were once the doctor's most potent therapeutic tool.20
could include the patient's entire functioning, the authors note that "two areas of
activity seem most involved with questions of medical responsibility. The first con-
sists . . . of arriving at a correct diagnosis on the basis of a thorough and accurte
examination . . . The second activity consists of performing dla~nosttc and thera.
peutic procedures containing some element of danger to the patient." The accon-
panying interview material suggests that in t two activities concem for physical
well-being is of primary or exclusive importance and that this aspect of medical
responsibility is presented well and in great detail. In contrast, other aspects seem
to bo the problem of disclosure. A studentasked what to tell patients "who would die very shortly of an inoperable tumor ...The staff member gave a long and complex answer, pointing out that frequentlypatients figured it out for themselves or, on the other hand, didn't want to know
anything about it. In either case the physician had no decision to make about
whether to tell or not."
Id. at n.20. See also H.S. ]3acxx.a, 13. Ga~r.t, E.C. HuGHrs, g: A.L. STRAUSS, BoYs IN Wnirrn
(1961).18. This does not mean that the physician personally and emotionally cared about
every patient he treated. Such personal attachmecnt would make continued practice tin.
bearable. An important part of every doctor's training is learning to view is patients'
illness with detachment.
19. In an earlier day . . . many practitioners would intuitively and almost auto-
matically take into account both the stresses and the potentials for therapeutie sup-
port which the environment afforded the patient. .... [Today] the problem of taking
the social context of the patient into account becomes greatly enlarged . ... [l']hiy-
sicians may find themselves backsliding from what they acknowledge to be the ap.propriate conception of the patient.
Merton, Convergence Toward the Sociology of Medical Education, in JAco 323, 325.This intuitive behavior also had a more dangerous aspect. Doctors have always been
warned not to deviate from their professional duties in adhering to the demands of the
patient:The physician should see to it that the patient s sentiments do not act upon his
sentiments a above all, do not thereby modify his behavior, and he shiolta d en-
deavor to act upon the patient's sentiments according to a well-considered plan.L. Henderson, supra note 6, at 821. The model of the emotional, demanding patient was
used to warn the physician not to discard his professionalism, for it was recognized that
the patient could modify his doctor's opinions and decisions through personal leveragegained from the doctor's reliance on client demand and long association. See FirnsoN at
226-27. Such influence is beneficial for both doctor and patient when it contributes to ap-
propriate management, but not when the doctor is persuaded to abandon all rcasonabe
treatment.20. The medical historian is apt to mislead us when he speaks of the learned andp
skilled doctors of the past. While undoubtedly exceptional instances might be un-
earthed to show that these physicians accomplished something for the somatic good
of their patients, in the large view we are forced to realize that their learning as at
learning in how to deal with men. Their skill was a skill deingdealg eita ie eoto-
tions o men. They themselves were the therapeutic agents by which cures were ef-
fected. Their therapeutic procedures, whether they were inert or whether they were
1540
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The doctor's personal bedside manner is now thought to have been a
form of psychotherapy, 21 which produced a transference phenomenon7
between doctor and patient and which contributed to the patient's re-
covery. The doctor's behavior could stimulate the patient's wish to get
well, and motivate the patient to accept the difficult and painful tasks
of treatment.23 Today the physician is proud of the science of medicine
and tends to ignore its art.
B. The Modern Medical Context
The rise of scientific medicine has dramatically changed medical
dangerous, were placebos, symbols by which their patients' faith and their ownt was
sustained.
The history of medicine is a history of the dynamic power of the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient .... However little the doctor had to offer, it was to him
that men turned in the distress of illness.
Houston, The Doctor Himself as a Therapeutic Agent, supra note 6, at 1418.
21. The traditional emphasis on the "bedside manner" is acknowledgement that the
way in which doctors handle their patients as personalities has an important effect
upon the functioning of their physiological systems. Much of the "art" of medicine
has consisted in this type of psychotherapy which is a necessary accompaniment of
all other therapy.
Stem, supra note 6, at 357.
22. Parsons describes the transference phenomenon as follows:
Through processes which are mostly unconscious the physician tends to acquire
various types of projective significance as a person which may not be directly rele-
vant to his specifically technical functions, though they may become of the first
importance in connection with psychotherapy ..... "[Transference" [is] the attribu-
tion to the physician of significances to the patient which are not "appropriate" in
the realistic situation, but which derive from the psychological needs of the patient.
For understandable reasons a particularly important class of these involves the at-
tributes of parental roles as experienced by the patient in childhood. Transference
is most conspicuous in "psychiatric" cases but there is every reason to believe that it
is always a factor in doctor-patient relationships ....
SociAL SYSTmi at 453.
Some psychiatrists differentiate between the early stages of the transference, when posi-
tive feelings toward the therapist predominate, and the full-blown "transference neurosis"
which is the "transfer of unconscious fantasies, emotions, attitudes of people in the past
onto the therapist during psychoanalytic treatment." Sifneos, Dynamic Psyahotherapy in
a Psychiatric Clinic, in 1961 CuRRENT PsYcrIAT'xnu Tszasms'z 168, 173. See also McGuire,
The Process of Short-Term Insight Psychotherapy, 141 J. OF NEnvous AND MENTrAL DIsazsn
83 (1965). It is this early "positive" stage which stimulates the patient's wish to please
his physician, and to conform to his treatment regimen. The transference between doctors
and patients is also mentioned in Szasz & Hollender, supra note 6, at 587, and described
in I. JANIS, PsYcHOLoGICAL SaXss 137 (1958).
23. Parsons & Fox, supra note 6, describe this process. The ph)sician first promotes
the patient's acceptance of the "sick" role. He encourages tie patent to give way to de-
pendency needs. He permits and accepts deviant behavior to show the patient that he is
taken seriously. Indulgence and support of the patient enhances the patient's desire to
cooperate with the doctor and to participate in the therapeutic effort.
This confirmatory behavior on the part of the physician also stimulates the transference
phenomenon.
In the early stages of the transference, the patient is motivated to please the ph)sician.
See note 22 supra. The physician introduces conditional rewards by his approval of the
patient's work and progress in the therapeutic situation. Progress is defined as renuncia-
tion of dependency, acceptance of the therapy whatever difficult and painful tasks it
might entail, and conformity to the physician's wish that the patient get well to as-
sume his normal role.
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training, almost eliminated the general practitioner, shifted the pri-
mary locus of treatment to the modem hospital, and begun to elimi-
nate the individual private practitioner. These changes have provided
countless technical benefits for patients. But, taken together, they also
account for the doctor's reduced personal knowledge of his patients,
for his limited ability to motivate them for treatment and for the un-
tempered authoritarianism which characterizes the modern doctor-
patient relationship.
Current medical training, located in the university and the hos-
pital, tends to give the physician a de-humanized, compartmental-
ized and institutionalized view of patients. 24 The medical student is
largely confined to the laboratory during his two pre-clinical years.
There his main contacts are with specimens and cadavers. These years,
it is thought, produce an emotional callousness which stifles the devel-
opment of personal attitudes toward health and disease."g In clinical
courses, the student is given a compartmentalized view of the patients;
the body is segmented into components for scientific study. The stu-
dent is overwhelmed with knowledge about bodily processes and is
confronted with the urgent need for specialization. Institutional per-
spectives are inculcated in the student's hospital training, where pa-
tients are introduced as hospital cases rather than full human beings.
Emphasis is placed on technical and clinical skills to be performed in
an institutional context rather than on learning how to re-integrate
the patient into his environment.26
24. These phrases are taken from Bloom, supra note 1, at 317. Before the development
of medical schools, the medical apprentice learned at the bedside and developed first-hand
experience with patients and disease in the home environment. Later in the schoolh the
lecture and the textbook replaced direct observation and the student learned from In-
struction rather than experience. When in the twentieth century the study of prhnary
sciences was integrated with medical education in the universities, the student returned
to the patient but not to the whole patient. The focus remained on the sclentlilc
study of his diseases. "The new methods for diagnosis and treatment, instead of taking
a place only as a means for achieving the goals of medicine ... tended to become ends In
themselves." Id. at 315.
25. The desire to be of service to persons suffering from pain and stress represents
a major motivation for undertaking the study of medicine, It deserves careful nurture
from the first moment of the medical student's career and should not be dampened
by two years of work in which human contact with patients is absent or minhual and
the emphasis is on science for science's sake.
Id. at 317.
26. For a resident, the completeness of the little world-with its dormitories, li.
braries, cafeterias, coffee shops, chapel, post office, laundry, tennis and basketball
courts, drugstore and magazine stand-combined with the intensity of training (the
average resident spends 126 hours a week in the hospital) can have some peculiar ef-
fects. It is quite possible to forget that the hospital stands in the midst of a larger
community, and that the final goal of hospitalization is reintegration of the patient
into that community. In this respect, the hospital is like two other institutions which
have a partially custodial function, schools and prisons. In each case, success Is best
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The vast increase in scientific knowledge has created the demand
for specialists who require the facilities and equipment of a modem
hospital for their practice.27 Only pediatricians and obstetricians pro-
vide comprehensive care for their patients. A man with chest pain
must make a hospital appointment and may have to consult a different
specialist for each different part of his body.28 The specialist in turn
adopts the role of a piece-worker and will accept no overall responsi-
bility for his patients.29 For most families, the only comprehensive ser-
measured not by the performance of the individual within the system, but after he
leaves it. And in each case there is a tendency to view institutional performance as an
end in itself.
CRICHTON at 202.
27. Medical students now select a specialty immediately upon graduation, rather than
first acquiring experience in general practice. They are motivated by the larger incomes
of specialists, by their opportunities to gain recognition, and by the opportunity to ad-
vance medical science through research.
The ideal of the physician-scientists, the clinician-researcher, is very much a prod-
uct of academic hospital values .. . . One may reasonably ask, for example, what is a
medical student being trained to become?
Without doubt the answer is: a house officer in a teaching hospital ....
What, then, is a house officer being trained to become? The answer is, an academic
physician specializing in acute, curative, hospital-based medidne.
CRICrON at 208.
28. Not long ago, a patient complaining of indigestion and pain in his stomach
would go to a physician and be diagnosed and treated in one or two office visits. To-
day, to have his condition diagnosed by scientific standards, he must have a gastroin-
testinal x-ray series, a chemical analysis of his gastric secretions and possibly one or
more gall bladder studies. Should the diagnosis be duodenal ulcer, the treatment is
likely to involve hospitalization of the patient from one to three months, with the
additional costs of all the routines prior to and during surgery or medication. In the
case of many patients, diagnostic procedures may be employed, not only to obtain
affirmative diagnoses... but to exclude the possible existence of other conditions. In
this way, the number of specialists who may be involved in a single case may be in-
creased considerably.
Stern, supra note 6, at 356. See also the fascinating story of the diagnosis of Edith Murphy
in CRICHTON at 157-63.
29. There is little doubt but that the specialist tends to confine his observation of
the causes of illness to the narrow field of vision with which he is most familiar. His
special training and experience bring certain symptoms into focus, while his lack of
experience in other fields dims his appreciation of the meaning of equally important
symptoms. He fails as a rule to consider the patient as a 'whole, either physiologically
or psychologically. Moreover, inasmuch as patients, for the most part, come to the
specialist only after their diseases are well advanced, the specialist's approach tends
to be almost exclusively curative and only incidentally preventive.
The hazards of specialization were expressed very bluntly by Lewellys F. Barker
when he wrote:
Specialists, as a class, are exposed to a particular set of dangers, including those
of the narrowness and the monotony of the "piece worker," those of loss of adapt-
ability, those of objectionable aggressiveness, those of stubborn opinionatedness,
those of boastful self-sufficiency, those of selfish materialism, and those of vanity
and arrogance. . .. Special workers should take pains to neutralize as far as possi-
ble the evils that tend to accompany concentrated interests and narrow ranges of
operation.
The criticism that specialists tend to develop a more impersonal physician-patient
relationship than in the days of the family doctor is often grounded in fact, and this
is to the detriment of medical practice. Stem, supra note 6, at 356-57.
As a British commentator has noted:
It seems a pity ... that many doctors have given up maternity work. Childbirth is a
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vice is offered in the emergency rooms of large hospitals where person-
nel changes frequently and the same physician is rarely seen for more
than one Visit.3 0
The high costs of facilities and equipment have forced doctors to
develop a hospital practice.31 The hospital's out-patient services are
ordinarily inadequate and unpopular,3 2 and the hospital provides al-
most nothing in the way of preventive treatment. The hospitalized
patient is removed from his normal environment. The treating phy-
sician has no contact with the patient's social context-his family, his
work, or the stresses of his emotional and societal difficulties.33 With no
social interaction, the physician and patient remain strangers.
Individual and even partnership practice is dying out as medical
groups34 have become increasingly attractive to practitioners, primarily
because a group provides opportunities for sharing responsibility and
primitive event deeply charged with emotion. A confinement successfully and sympa.
thetically managed welds mother and child and the whole family to tile doctor it a
way that nothing else can do. No doubt there are good reasons for leaving tils task
to a specialized, though of necessity somewhat impersonal, expert bit htman valueg
are unquestionably lost.
Ferguson, The Doctor-Patient Relationship and "Functional" Illness, in JACO 433, 431.
30. Crichton describes the Emergency Ward of the Massachusetts Gencial Hospital:
The EW is the place where the haste, the crowding, and the impersonality are seen
in their most exaggerated form. . . Its growth in recent years has been phenoienail.
Its patient load has been increasing steadily at a rate of 10 per cent per year for
nearly a decade. It now treats more than 65,000 patients a year.
CRlCHTON at 21.
31. The true hospital costs-the expenses incurred in a hospital but not in a hotel-
are. . . very high. They account for 82 per cent of the total per-day room charge....
The maintenance of [the) new technological capacity costs money .... If you "ate go.
ing to pay these employees a decent wage, then your care will be exlensivc. If you ate
going to purchase technological hardware, maintain it, and keep st up-to.date, this
costs money.
Id. at 67-68.
32. [M]any patients are "lost to follow-up," to use the hospital's expression, they
don't answer the social worker's calls, or they don't keep their clinic appointment.
Nor can they be wholly faulted in this regard, for the hospital's out-patlent services
are, in general, quite time consuming. . . . Not only does the patient spend hours hit
the clinic itself, but he must take the time to travel to and from the hospital on each
visit.
Id. at 32-33.
33. In the patient's home, the physician was able to appraise the patient In an en.
tirely personalized and significant social situation. When the patients began to relate
to the physician in his office, an increased degree of formality entered into the rela.
tionship. The fragmentation of the relationship between the patient and his physt.
cian reached its peak upon entry into the hospital. The patient finds that others,
such as nurses, technicians, residents and interns, as well as other medical speciallsts
occasionally enter into the treatment process in addition to his own physician. The
treatment-setting in the hospital now often includes total strangers who take his pulse,
temperature, blood, urine, x-rays, bring meals, ask him personal questions, make his
bed and clean his room, administer sedatives, and attend to his many needs.
Jaco, Introductory: Medicine and Behavioral Science in JACO 3, 5.
34. The medical group involves "[tlhe application of medical service by a number of
physicians working in systematic association with the joint use of equipment and teclini.




providing up-to-date medical care. The influence of the patient over
his physician's practice declines as the influence of group-colleagues
increases. Physicians within a group are largely interchangeable and the
efficiency of their operation as a group assumes a value above personal
understanding of the patient-3
C. Effects of the Depersonalized Relationship
Harmful effects are suffered by those patients who experience deper-
sonalized, authoritarian relationships with their physicians.30 These
35. Friedson's study describes this phenomenon:
The very cooperative organization that stimulates the development of professional
control of the quality of technical care also stimulates the development of unprece-
dented professional control of the client.
Some of these new constraints are founded on what are essentially rules of etiquette.
Interestingly, they seem to be the ones that the profession has alwa)s wished the pa.
tient would follow but that, by and large, it has until now been unable to enforce.
One previously unenforceable rule states that the patient should not himself consult
another doctor for his medical opinion while he is under the care of the one he ini-
tially consulted: an additional opinion should be sought only through the doctor who
has been treating the patient. Another rule states that the patient should not seek
specialist care himself, but should ask his attending phyiian to refer him: he should
go through channels. Both of these rules seek to reduce unwitting competition by sus-
taining a professionally controlled structure of relationships among physicians. While
their enforcement may limit some small waste of scarce professional time, and while
it is conceivable that under some circumstances the patient may do himself harm, it
is not at all self-evident that these rules are medically, fully justified. Whatever else,
they extend professional control over the terms of work and reduce the patient's free-
dom of activity in seeking help. And it would seem obvious that practice within an
organization is much better able to enforce those rules than is solo practice.
Those rules may be embodied-as they are in the Montefiore Medical Group-in
the officially stated regulations of the organization. Other rules, however, not neces-
sarily officially stated or even officially recognized may be as important to the fate of
the patient. In most organizations these informal norms, developed and sustained by
people who work together, focus on definitions of work and on the people and orga-
nizations connected with that work. Norms of work tend to distinguish between what
is good and desirable and what lowly and undesirable among the activities that the
worker may be called upon to perform. And they tend to define what is a fair day's
work and its limits, what kind of work is "really" necessary for the performance of a
task, and, of course, what is fair compensation. Norms about personnel tend to involve
a definition of the relation of the administration and its representatives to the worker,
to distinguish between the lowly and the high, the lazy and the dangerously energetic
among fellow-workers, and the "good" and "bad" clients. They define, in short, the
stance the worker takes toward those events, people, and pressures that both constitute
and interrupt the orderly and convenient routine of a fair and reasonable day's work.
While they cannot be completely separated from the question of technical standards,
it is certain that, whatever else, they involve professional conceptions of working con-
ditions. Those social standards are often disguised as, and confounded with, technical
medical standards, and given the same sacrosanct position. They can better solidify
and be enforced in an organization than in practice by isolated individuals....
Some of these constraints may be justified by the fact that they are essential to allow-
ing and encouraging the physician to practice a high quality of medicine. This is
probably not true of all such constraints, however, for some, supported by the same
organization that allows the development of higher technical standards, are likely
merely to serve the convenience of the practitioner and increase his control of the
terms of his work without any necessary relation to the quality of his work.
Id. at 225-27.
36. Some of these patients can be identified as thoe who live in areas recent)' deseried
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relationships can lead to mistaken diagnoses and poor medical deci.
sion-making and practice. They also may arouse the patient's anxiety
rather than encouraging trust in the physician.
The physician who maintains authoritarian control sees no need to
communicate effectively with his patients about treatment.37 Patients,
most doctors believe, cannot understand today's complex scientific pro-
cedures and should not be told about risks and alternatives to proposed
treatments. 38 By failing to initiate significant discussion on the illness
itself, the doctor often remains ignorant of the personal information
about each individual39 which might affect, and even alter, his decisions
by general practitioners-notably large urban centers and rural areas. A study as far
back as 1945 revealed that of 865 households in New York City, 2/s had no family doctor
and for the V3 which reported such a physician, the continuity upon which such a relation
is based was largely non-existent. Stem, supra note 6, at 260. From 1928 to 1942 the per-
centage of general practitioners among the nation's physicians declined from 74% to 49%.
Id. at 354. Others are patients whose doctor does not follow them into the hospital, where
they are treated by strangers. And many are simply those who consult a speciallst with
wham they have had no previous contact.
In small homogeneous communities, is possible for the family backgrounds of pa-tients, both medical and socal, to be well-known to the physiian over a long periodof years. The situation is very different in larger sopay and economically heteroge-neous communities. Here patients are for the most part strangers who come to an alicefor medical care without any social contact whatsoever with the physican, and remain
strangers over the years. ... Id. at I57-58.57. A study of fifty doctor-patient relationships in a large medical clinic reveals that:(a) one-third of the patients were told nothing beyond the fact that tests x, y and z
were to be done; that is, they were given no explanation of the tests on any level.
(b) one-half of the patients were told, with regard to at least one test, what organ ar
possible disease was being investigated by the test; for example, thley might have beentold they were to have an X-ray of their chest.
(c) the remaining 14 per cent of the patients received an explanation, with regard toat least one test, of thee p of evidence the tests would provide, or what the test meano in
terms of a possible disease.
The findings for the physician's handling of the other information areas were min
lar. Physicians were significantly more likely to give some explanation rather than none at
all. A small minority received what could be called a rounded explanation; while the
majority received a limited number of isolated facts. It was further found that physicians
were more likely to avoid completely discussion of prognoisis and etiology, than they wereto bypass the more immediately practical issues of tests and treatment, Pratt, Selgnan
Reader, Physician's View on the Level ot Medical Information Among Patients, v JCO
222, 226-27.38. Typical statements of this belief follow:
Risk is a concept, belief, or understanding that resides in the doctor. The patient
cannot estimate risk. The doctor has to be completely fair, albeit not necessarily co t
pletely truthful. The patient should be given enough facts to decide whether or not
he is taking a risk. Admittedly he may, and should, transfer to the physician a d-
gree of judgment .... The doctor should not, I think, presume to tell anybody aboutthe degree of risk, except in a certain limited area,
Comments of Irving Ladimer, DAxn zLUS Pnocaaaxnos at 48.In therapeutic interventions, it is unnecessary to discuss with the patient the various
alternatives. I do not think that it is possible to systematize, stylize, legislate or for-
malize the conversations that go on at this levl because they depend on the patient.
Some patients will be physicians who know a great deal and are extremely interested
in every conceivable detail; other patients are totally uneducated.
Comments of Dr. Francis D. Moore, DAolwus POCEEDINGS at 81.89. The patient, in turn, often confronting a physican whom he knows only slightly
or not at all, is more apt to experience difficulty in communicating a sense of is
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about diagnosis and treatment. Yet, for most medical problems there
is no single possible and proper remedy 0 Because the physician fails
to see the patient as a human problem, his diagnosis may be wrong, and
his choice of treatment may be unnecessary or inadequate 4' Patients
may also undergo procedures which are personally undesirable or ab-
horrent and which may involve risks and results they would not want
to face.F
daily life-his relationships within the family and outside, the stresses of his work
situation, his difficulties in coping with the demands of his multiple roles in society.
Merton, supra note 19, at 325.
40. Most treatments, then and now, have available alternatives, one of which may be
no treatment at all. There is seldom a single, objectively ascertainable "best" theory for
any given patient. Debates among physicians about the course of treatment for thyroid
problems, hypertension, and textbook disputes about the treatment of puncture wounds
are illustrative of the variations and alternatives which exist as viable therapies. See eg.,
Stanbury, Hyperthyroidism in Crcmx-LoEB To--ooK oF MEiICINE 1292-94 (P. Beeson &
R. McDermot eds. 1967); Perera, Hypertensive Vascular Disease: Therapeutic Principles
and Objectives, DlSa.sEs 472-76 (Chrian ed. 1955).
There is an important "uncertainty" factor in medical practice which keeps every in-
tervention from being foolproof. The uncertainty stems from the limits of man's knowl-
edge about medical science, and the uniqueness of every human body. For discussion of
the concept of uncertainty, see Fox, Training for Uncertainty, in Tis SrUDENT-PitvSiCIA,
207 (R. Merton ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as SrnmENTr-PiivsicxAN
This choice of the best course of action may depend more on the patient involved than
objective, scientific criteria.
41. In their study of a modem university hospital, Raymond Duff and August Hol-
ingshead report that nearly one-half of all complaints registered by patients were about
the communications of the doctors; and they conclude that "the complaints about te
technical performance of the physician and the lack of coordination of the hospital staff
are traceable frequently to the phlsidan-patient communication failure:' I. DuFs &
A. HO.LINGSHEAD, SicKNEss AD Socaxry 286 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DurF & HOL-
LINGSHEAD].
They report that 38% of the patients they observed were diagnosed incorrectly and that
physicians made no effort to diagnose mental illness even when it was evident and con-
tributed to the patient's problem. Id. at 165-66. On the basis of their data, they also con-
dude that errors in diagnosis were linked to inappropriate management and that a total
of 39% of the patients studied received less than appropriate management, Id. at 176-77.
The quality of care a patient receives is difficult for an observer to assess, and empirical
studies of this question are rare. However in 1962 the School of Public Health and Ad-
ministrative Medicine of Columbia University undertook a study of the quality of hospi-
tal care received by a sample of Teamster family members in New York. Thirteen clini-
cians were asked to review the hospital records of 430 admissions in 98 'New York City
Hospitals. 57% of the cases received optimal care, 43% less than optimal. The data was
also broken up into specialty fields-80% of the patients received optimal care in obstet-
rics/gynecology, 57% in general surgery, and only 31% in general medicine. As problems
in the field of internal medicine are major causes of hospitalization, a further inquiry was
made into the internal medicine records. The researchers found that poor ph)sical care
was often related to lack of communication between doctor and patient.
The conclusion was, however, that such findings did indeed reflect 'less than optimal'
management, that there was failure to explore fully the symptoms for which the pa-
tient had been hospitalized and to establish a diagnosis for which a rational treat-
ment program could be instituted. Columbia University School of Public Health and
Administrative Medicine, A Study of the Quality of Hospital Care Secured by a Sam-
ple of Teamster Family Members in New York City 7-9 (1964).
42. The modem physician is instructed to choose the "best" therapy, regardless of its
personal impact on the patient:
n many instances, a serious medical condition may admit of several therapeutic
decisions. Suppose that a young woman consults her physician with a sarcoma of the
arm. The doctor is confronted with the possibility of giving no therapy, in which
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Confrontations with physicians may also increase the patient's anxi-
ety because the doctor's impersonal behavior threatens the patient's
sense of identity and integrity.43 The doctor's authority can become
case she will certainly die, or of amputating the arm, or of administering various
chemotherapeutic agents, or of giving radiation therapy. In practice, the physician
selects what appears to him to be the wisest of these alternatives. He sensitively anddelicately communicates this decision to the patient. . . . But no respected physician
who is considerate of his patient would think of telling her all the implications ofthe disease. The essence of a good doctor is that he must assume responsibility forthe management of the patient's illness, and an essential part of this responsibilityis not to burden the patient with unnecessary anxieties which would inevitably resultfrom a full exposition of the disease, its implications, and the therapeutic experiment.Talalay, A Summary of Comments, in DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY 278 (P. Talalay ed. 1961).But how can even a "good doctor" know which form of therapy will be personally tol-erable, let alone acceptable, to the young woman involved? Talalay admits there is no
certain cure-perhaps life with an amputated arm would be unbearable for this woman,
or radiation treatment is so frightening she would miss appointments and resist the doe.tor's management. The "best" therapy should be the one which is best for a partictlarindividual, as illustrated by the following report:
In May, 1958, a physician called and asked me to come immediately to his office to
see a patient with a lump in her breast. He had arranged for her to enter the hospi-tal the following day under the care of a well-known cancer surgeon, but at lunch-
time she had dismissed him and was now asking for me.The patient was the widow of one of my teachers of medicine .... There was, in-deed, a lump in one of her breasts which felt as if it were malignant. Not knowing
why she had dismissed the other surgeon, I was wary in what I said. I began by re-
minding her that I was not sure about the nature of the lump, and that as the lrst
step she should have a biopsy to establish its identity. I told her that we did not needto go beyond a biopsy until we had a chance to consult with each other. She agreed.
When I saw her alone at the hospital the next day, she said, "I expect you are sur.prised that I have asked you to care for nte. I first noticed the hump in tny breast
several months ago. It has been slowly increasing in size. I had decided that I woulddo nothing about it and accept the consequences. But, recently my arthritis flared upand I had to see my physician. I did not tell him about the lump, but lie, of course,found it. As I expected, he insisted that I be operated upon, and the surgeon he fist
chose for me unequivocally advised that I have my breast removed.
"It may seem strange to you, but I have a horror of losing my breast. I ant 62,
my husband is dead, and I have no thought of marrying again. However, I ant stillhorrified by the thought of losing my breast, and I asked for you because I thoughtyou might help me find a way to keep it."
I told my teacher's widow that I would ask Dr. Robbins to treat her with radiationif the lump proved to be malignant, as indeed it did. I also followed my promise toher to remove only the lump and not the breast. Her physician was very upset whenI did not do the traditional mastectomy, and her son-in-law, also a physician, was
outraged at my neglect.After radiation of the breast and adjacent areas, the secondary lump melted away,
and my patient was remarkably well for the next six years. Then suddenly she feltpoorly, lost strength and weight, and died within a month at the age of 68.
What is strange is that the surgeon has been so slow to realize how woman feels
about her breasts. The only adequate explanation for his lack of feeling is that theproblem of mutilation is too much for him to manage. Only when mutilation is putto him in terms of an analogy-the loss of his masculinity-does lie react to It.Woman has been willing to put up with a mastectomy when she was told therewas no other way to rid her of the tumor. Now that there is a feasible alternative,the efforts of medicine should be directed toward improving the non-mutilating tiler.
apy. She has a right to demand this of the profession.0. Cope, Breast Cancer: Has The Time Come for a Less Mutilating Treatment? 54 RAD
CLIFFE QUARTERLY 6, 7, 10 (1970).43. Personal identity is basically at issue for the patient. It is a truism, of course,
1548
Restructuring Informed Consent
frightening, rather than creating trust and confidence. Patients' resent-
ment 4 at being treated like objects may lead them to resist, rather than
accept treatment.-I The successful transference phenomenon can only
that in order to do his work effectively the physician must in some sense be able to
strip the identity from the patient's body as he works on it so as not to lose his ob-
jectivity, but it is that very identity which is the most precious assertion of the pa-
tient, and its loss, when it is apparent, seems to be rather unpleasanL It is very easy
to be mawkish, and consequently blind to the very real contrary demands of practice
itself in discussing this side of the patient role, but the degree to which the patients
studied were preoccupied with it was strikingly intense. To them, a satisfactory phy-
sician must seem to take enough personal interest in them so that they will feel no
threat to their identities as persons.
FPJMsoN at 52.
44. Earl Koos in his study of private practitioners in a metropolitan area found the
criticism focused not on technical skills but upon the nature of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship.
51% of the respondents criticized the physicians of Metropolis for being unwilling to
make house calls..... 64% of the replies indicated that modern, technic-centered
medical practice lacked the human warmth of the old-time general practitioner (who
possibly knew less about medicine but more about his patients). . . T]he respon-
dents in the families with husbands under 40 years of age were even more definite in
this criticism than were those in the older age group. In the words of a young Class II
matron: "We're new at this (raising a family). If we could feel that we mean something
to Dr. - , I'd be happy with him. But I'm sure he has to look at baby's history,
or have his nurse tell him who we are, so he'll know what to call me .... Its like
running through an assembly line to go to his office. I'm sure, though, that he
knows his medicine--from that point I'm satisfied."
[In sum] they tend to be satisfied with what they get and to accept its cost, but
they dislike the way it is provided.
Koos, "Metropolis"--What City People Think of Their Medical Services, in JAco 113, 114.
The following comment is illustrative:
I don't say our hospitals don't turn you out alive-at least most often they don't
kill you-but the way they treat you while you are in their hands is pitiful . ..
I can't put my finger on it exactly. I think what I'm trying to say is nobody just
gave a dam about me as a person. I was just somebody filling a bed.
Id. at 115.
Duff and Hollingshead discovered widespread dissatisfaction among patients. Their find-
ings are sumnmarized as follows:








Du-F 8- HOLLNGsa D 280.
Duff and Hollingshead also report their findings of staff physicians' attitudes toward
ward patients:
When we asked them about the patients, they usually knew the nature of the patient's
disease and something about his ongoing treatment but they knewv little about the
patients as human beings.... One intern was more precise in his vies... : "I can.
not answer your questions. You're interested in patients. I'm interested in the disease
in the body in the bed."
Id. at 128.
For further comments on patients' dissatisfaction, see FRIEDsoN at 49-56.
45. Friedson reports in his study of 7200 health service units in the Bronx that:
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develop when the patient senses the doctor's feelings of concern and in-
terest. In the depersonalized relationship, the patient's wish to please his
physician by getting well is not stimulated and the patient loses motiva-
tion for treatment. The physician therefore relies on his status, rather
than his bedside manner, to command obedience. 40 He has the power to
instill fear of the consequences if treatment is not accepted or to
threaten the loss of a hospital bed and termination of the relationship. 4
Physicians often fail to recognize that the anxiety and hostility they
arouse can worsen the patient's chance for recovery.48 When a patient
Many patients would not accept the services of the social worker in spite of their
need and recommendation of the physician and nurse. In the Montefiore Hospital
Medical Group a sizeable proportion of patients chose to avoid services to which they
were entitled by contract. A lesser but nonetheless important proportion of Demon-
stration patients used outside services even when they were enrolled in a program
with which they expressed overwhelming general satisfaction. Analysis indicated that
the patient rejected professional services when they did not fit into his scheme of
things-when they were isolated from the steps he goes through in seeking help, when
they contradicted his own and his lay consultants' conception of illness and treatment,
when they were insulated from the way by which he and his lay consultants try to
establish their reliability, and when they required him to sacrifice personal conveni-
ence. The professional expects patients to accept what he recommends on his tenns;
patients seek services on their own terms. In that each seeks to gain his own terms,
there is conflict.
Id. at 171.
46. Szasz and Hollender refer to the potential for authoritarian behavior in the tradi.
tional model:
Often, threats and other undisguised weapons of force are employed, even though
presumably for the patient's "own good," ... [Tjhe possibility of the exploitation of
the situation-as in any relationship between persons of unequal power-for the sole
benefit of the physician, albeit under the guise of altruism is ever present,
Szasz 9- Hollender, supra note 6, at 587.
47. Ideally, the authority of the doctor is not his own, is not personal, but ig that of
medical science; but he necessarily has wide arbitrary power. The immediate relation
is one of command and obedience; the patient is "under the doctor's orders," though
he has selected the doctor, ordered him to give the orders, and may do as he pleases
about obeying any order, or-under individualism-may dismiss the doctor at will,
i.e. withdraw from the two-party group. But at best this freedom, or power, is theo-
retical rather than real. The connection once established, change is difficult and may
be a matter of life or death to the patient; and the doctor has every incentive to make
him believe that it would be serious, and is in a position to do so-only more or les
limited by ethics and various social forces. Limitation of the doctor's power is largely
in the hands of his profession, which is naturally inclined to give him the benefit of
the doubt.
F. KNIGHT, supra note 7, at 360.
The doctor's increasing emotional detachment from his patients makes such threats
possible.
All of us who have worked in hospitals know, from our own experience, how easily
even the degree of detachment which all doctors and nurses must cultivate-to make
their lives bearable and enable them to do their work properly-can turn Into cal-
lousness. And if he has an object in mind which seems to him important, the man
who has become callous may, quite unawares, become ruthless.
Fox, The Ethics of Clinical Trials, 28-29 MEDICO-LEGAL JOURNAL 135 (1960-61).
48. C. Brant and B. Kutner interviewed fifty patients in a large municipal teaching
hospital to elicit their feelings about hospitalization and their knowledge and understand.
ing of diagnosis and contemplated surgery. The authors summarized some of their results
as follows:
The paucity and infrequency of communication from the professional personnel
about their illnesses, therapy and impending events leads patients sometimes to ac.
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has objected to or refused treatment, the doctor feels personally threat-
ened. Rather than trying to analyze what went wrong, he blames the
patient for being unreasonable.49 Insistence on the "irrationality" of
patients precludes any attempt to understand the patient's state of
mind or lack of motivation.50
D. Medical Reform
Medical educators have recognized that depersonalized medicine
affects medical decision-making and patient motivation. Reforms have
been introduced to restore the personalized aspect of medical practice.
Courses in psychiatry and behavioral sciences are now part of the basic
curriculum," and in many schools the entire training process has been
quire misinformation and misinterpretations by asking questions of other patients....
Patients rarely know in advance of normal, predictable postoperative events such as
the routine stay in the recovery room following surgery and preceding returning to
the ward, the expectation of some pain at the operative site for a time or the neces-
sity of early ambulation. Some patients presume that the total time off the -ard ..as
spent in the operating room in a lengthy, extensive and difficult procedure, misinter-
pret postoperative pain as surgical failure, and regard the effort of the nurse or aide
to have them leave their bed a few days postoperatively as callousness if not sadism.
In amputation of the Pegs], the patient seldom acquires a thorough understanding
... of the compelling necessity of this drastic procedure. His normal anxieties con-
cerning the operation and his probable future adjustments do not usually undergo
thorough discussion with the house staff physician. Few amputees who possess good
rehabilitation potential acquire this hopeful information preoperatively. Seldom are
they made aware before operation, of the time, effort and services awailable to deal
with re-ambulation, rehabilitation and prosthesis.
Brant & Kutner, Physician-Patient Relations in a Teaching Hospital, 32 J. MAm. ED=c.
703, 705-06 (1957).
49. An illuminating example of the doctor's willingness to accuse the patient of un-
reasonableness:
By the time I got my second re-visit, Mrs. B., my toxic thyroid case, she (sic) had
been waiting some time. ... She gave me the story of continuation of her previous
symptoms with shaking even more apparent at present. Of the tests ordered, only the
BMR came back, but this was condusive, being 59% above normal. I informed her that
all her problems were related to these findings, and after discussing her with Dr. D.
told her that hospitalization and surgery were her best chance for a permanent cure. At
this she broke down in tears, and after composing herself, made many arguments
against surgery .... Dr. D. and I quickly agreed that I should treat her with propyl-
thiouradil on an ambulatory basis until she has quieted down. This is an unnatural
response to hospitalization and surgery, and I'll be interested in seeing if she becomes
more logical with the quiescence of her toxic symptoms ....
Fox, supra note 17, at 228-0.
50. Note the medical student's desire that Mrs. 13. become more "logical," in note 49
supra.
[L]ack of confidence and lack of detachment seem to develop when students work
with patients whom they define as uncooperative, that is, patients who do not con-
form to their expectations. Students may, on the one hand, come to doubt the ade-
quacy of their ability to handle such patients. At the same time, they may feel some
annoyance at patients whose behavior they consider deviant.
Martin, Preferences for Types of Patients, in STDmrr-PHYsIcsA. 201.
As detachment and confidence increase, irritation and involvement decrease and stu-
dents become increasingly willing to take on "uncooperative" patients, probably because
they feel they can ignore their problems and deal with them in summary fashion. For
statistics on student preferences for patients, see id. at 201-02.
51. These courses were introduced to present the "art" of medicne in a formalized
learning situation.
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reconstructed. The medical student is frequently introduced to living
patients in his first year, and some schools have shortened the pre-clin-
ical period altogether.52 Some schools have introduced students to spe-
cial out-patient, comprehensive family care clinics.53
These reforms, however, are inadequate. The medical profession
has begun to concentrate on the task of restoring some personalized
aspects of the doctor-patient relationship without attempting to elim-
inate authoritarianism.
Personalized relationships with patients cannot be recaptured through
education. Increasing the students' first-hand experience with patients,
especially in out-patient or neighborhood clinics, may help sensitize
them to the needs and problems of patients as individuals. But, unless
the entire delivery system of health care services is revolutionized,
medical practice will continue to be based on a scientific tradition of
technological procedures and limited personal contact. 4
Doctors will therefore have to rely on the information gleaned
from these bureaucratized contacts to make decisions about their
patients; and as long as they manage their patients in an authoritarian
manner, they will fail to elicit or communicate important information,
The art of medicine is striving for the discipline of a social science of medicine, This
is a reflection of a shift in the requirements of medical practice. The emphasis has
shifted from questions of what and how to whom; that is from the knowledge and
techniques of biological science as they apply to disease to the patient, his feelings
and potential reactions to the whole complex of factors involved in his illness, In-
cluding the physician and the way the physician acts in the doctor-patient relation.
ship. Bloom, supra note 1, at 316. Another major development that has aided In
bringing behavioral science into medicine has been the increasing recognition and
treatment of "functional illness," those ailments without apparent physical etiology.
Although the father of medicine, Hippocrates, recognized the emotional and environ-
mental aspects of illness, the orientation of medicine has traditionally been biologi-
cal or "physical." The typical physician then and now feels more at home In his role
of healer when he treats the organic components of the individual than when he trieg
to cope with the emotional and "mental" complaints and ailments of his patlents.
One partial explanation for this is that the physical and biological sciences Piave far
exceeded the social and psychological sciences in both their development and maturity
as scientific fields; in turn their own contributions to the education and training of
the physician were accepted earlier. However, functional disorders often strikingly
reveal the limitations of the biological sciences in comprehending them. Consequently,
lacking training in the behavioral sciences, the physician is less secure in handling
patient-problems that may be regarded as falling within the domain of psychology
and the social sciences.
JACO, Introductory: Medicine and Behavioral Science, in JAco at 6. See also erguson,
supra note 29, at 433.
52. Both of these changes combat the dehumanizing effects of the laboratory years.
Medical teaching is often integrated across the lines of clinical subjects, and even across
the boundaries of preclinical and clinical years, so that the patient is less compartmental.
ized into discrete and independently functioning physical units.
53. See, e.g., the discussion of the Cornell Comprehensive Care and Teaching Program
in STUDENT-PHYSICIAN at 245-87.
54. Emphasis on technical procedures over personal contact may increase wlth lde rise
of computer diagnosis and decision-making. See CsacirroN at 151.
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and they will continue to arouse anxiety and hostility. 5 Abandonment
of authoritarianism in favor of sharing decision-making power with
patients would provide the contemporary doctor with the chance to
make more personalized decisions which maximize contemporary tech-
nical benefits.
The educational reforms also fail to teach the student the impor-
tance of the psychotherapeutic aspects of the healing process. Courses
in psychiatric theory and practice might help him develop the personal
insight and skills to encourage the transference phenomenon, even
with limited personal contact,G and to motivate the patient to accept
treatment. Stimulation of these feelings are an important part of the
therapeutic process which should not be overlooked.57 But concen-
tration on the emotional, non-clinical aspects of the doctor-patient
relationship is not seriously encouraged 5s even in medical school, and
during the internship and residency the art of medicine is practically
forgotten.59
55. See pp. 1546-51 supra.
56. See the discussion of short-term psychotherapy in the references cited note 22,
supra.
57. The doctor has traditionally been exhorted to capture his patient's sentimental
attachment.
Try at all times to act upon the patient so as to modify his sentiments to his own
advantage, and remember that, to this end, nothing is more effective than arousing
in him the belief that you are concerned whole-heartedly and exclusively for his wel-
fare.
Henderson, supra note 6, at 823.
The argument that:
the superficiality of the physician's relation with patients.. . does not really matter
so long as the proper diagnostic and therapeutic techniques are used... does not
recognize the fact that necessary conditions for the application of knowledge are so-
ciological rather than medical. Patients must be satisfied enough to come in, in the
first place, and to cooperate in treatment.
FEnMsoN at 224 (emphasis added).
58. As John Knowles has pointed out, medicine gained acceptance within the uni-
versity as a valid discipline not because of its advances as a social science, but because
of its discoveries as a natural science. For nearly a century, natural science has been
the paydirt, and the behavioral art has taken a subordinate position. Reversing the
trend of a century will take some doing.
CRcM-oN at 205.
59. Kutner, Surgeons and Their Patients: A Study in Sodal Perception in JAco 384,
presents an analysis of residency training for surgeons. The general conclusions are ap-
plicable to most specialty training programs.
During his surgical residency, the trainee becomes increasingly immersed in the lan-
guage, sights, smells and activities of the surgical clinics, wards and operating rooms.
The exigencies of a heavy work schedule, a large patient load and the necessity of
mastering the specialized knowledge and techniques of a field having manifold com-
plexities, makes understandable the resident's tendency to place the technical medico-
surgical aspects of each case in the forefront of his thinking. For these and other rea-
sons questions of a psycho-social nature tend to become obscured or obliterated in
patient management. The low valuation of psl-cho-social factors in surgery among
residents results in a series of distortions regarding the surgeon's role, the process of
surgery and the future of the patient which we shall consider at a later point. It
should be stressed here that the literature is amply filled with exhortations and urg-
ings to "regard the patient's needs" and to "give the patient comprehensive care:'
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Perhaps this avoidance of psychiatric methods is a good thing,
for deliberate manipulation of the patient's feelings could lead to a
more refined form of authoritarianism, if practiced within the current
medical context. But, arguably, in a relationship based on mutual shar-
ing of information and mutual decision-making, encouragement of
the transference need not decrease the patient's freedom of choice or
increase his dependency. In the psychoanalytic model, the patient's in-
dependence is encouraged, while the transference feelings are used
as tools for therapy.60 The manipulative aspects of the authoritarian
relationship might be abandoned without sacrificing the transference
phenomenon and the encouragement of feelings which motivate the
patient for treatment.
Therefore, while the medical profession should not abandon its
attempts to increase the opportunities for personalized relationships
between doctors and patients, authoritarianism must be attacked as
well. Doctors must be encouraged to gain insight into themselves and
to study whether their attitudes and needs for power01 perpetuate an
Id. at 385-86.
In general, house staff physicians on the surgical service do not often conceive of
the physician-patient relationship as an integral, important, part of their role. There
is little agreement among them concerning the communicative aspect of their rela-
tions to the surgical patient, and a tendency to view this as quite incidental and pe.
ripheral to their "real" concerns. Some house staff physicians believe that the teach-
ing hospital does not provide the proper setting or amount of time for developing
their relations with patients, but that once they enter private practice this phase of
their work will develop naturally or spontaneously.
The "real" concerns referred to revolve about the learning role of the typical house
officer. The teaching hospital is the proper locale to concern oneself with the techno
logical aspects of surgery in all its phases. The psycho-social aspects of surgery are
relegated to a low priority of factors to be considered in the preparation for carrying
out and management of operative problems. Since the surgeon in training conceives
of himself to be primarily a trainee in surgery rather than in "bedside-doctoring" lie
naturally assumes that patient-centered medical care should be a matter to concern
him only in private practice. A paradoxical stituation presents itself. The surgical
trainee expects to learn the techniques of inter-personal management of surgical pa.
tients following entry into private practice. At the same time, since he is largely unts
trained in this area by the time he concludes his residency training, he is largely 1iit-
prepared for this type of management among the private patients he is now to see,
Id. at 395.
Michael Crichton states that:
The rationale for giving [doctors] the training they got, as preparation for the work
they would be doing, was formerly coucled as "if they can handle the problems they
see in the hospital, they can handle anything." It is obviously untrue, except for those
diseases that are scientifically understood and medically treatable; patients with other
complaints may get a more sympathetic ear from their next-door neighbor.
CRicHTON at 204.
60. [P]sychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists tend to agree that client participation
per se is constructive rather than harmful. D. Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 12. See, e.g.,
C. ROGERS, CLINT-CrNTERa THERAPY (1965) and M. GIL, R. NEWMAN & F. RanuIoCU,
THE INrITAL INTERVIEW IN PsYcHIATRIc PiAcricE 82-83 (1954).
61. Some medical writers have commented on these attitudes:
Doctors should step down from the near divine role and give up the pose of
omnipotence and omniscience.
Ferguson, supra note 29, at 435, 437. See also, Bloom, supra note 1, at 318-19.
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authoritarian relationship which no longer serves the best interests
of patients. Medical education should explore alternative, non-author-
itarian roles for physicians which will allow them to make personalized
decisions and motivate their patients, even in a relatively depersonal-
ized setting. These changes, hopefully, will meet the more subtle
problems currently bedeviling the doctor-patient relationship; an al-
teration in the law, while consistent with-perhaps essential to-move-
ment towards a partnership mode, can hope to correct only the more
flagrant abuses caused by depersonalized, authoritarian medicine.
II. Informed Consent-A Legal Therapy
A. The Current Law of Informed Consent-The Need for the Pa-
tient's Standard of Care
According to law, consent is the mechanism by which the patient
grants the physician the power to act 2 and which theoretically pro-
tects the patient against limitations of his freedomta and invasions of
his person. When a patient challenges the adequacy of the information
disclosed to him, 4 the determination of how much information he
62. Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's firt and greatest right,
which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of his person, m other
words, his right to himself-is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right
necessarily forbids a ph)sidan or surgeon, however skillful or eminent, who has been
asked to examine, diagnose, advise, and prescribe (which are at least necessary first
steps in treatment and care), to violate without .perms ion the bodily integty o.
his patient by a major or capital operation, placing him under anaesetic for that
purpose, and operating on him without his consent or knowledge...
Pratt v. Davis, 118 111. App. 161, 166, aff'd 224 IM. 00, 79 NE. 562 (1805).
As articulated by judge Cardozo in Schioendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 123,
129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914): "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body...
63. The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from the wish on the part
of the individual to be his own master. I ish my life and decisions to depend on
myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my
own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved
by reasons, by consdous purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me,
as it were, from outside. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking.
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his choices and able to explain them
by reference to his own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe
this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.
L BEraN, Two CoNcEPS OF LaRrY 16 (1958).
The Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.d 1093, 1104
(1960), expressed this concept as follows:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough going self-determination.
It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may,
if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life.saving surgery,
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form
of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.
64. Consent litigation has been based primarily on tort law. See McCord, A Re-
appraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 Mum. L. RLv. 381 (1957)
for a complete discussion of consent litigation prior to the onslaught of "informed consent"
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needs to have been told65 is evaluated as a medical decision which
is judged by the professional standard of disclosure in the commu-
nity:6 6 what would a reasonable doctor have done in the circumstances?
litigation. The doctor's failure to obtain consent has been termed both an intentional tort
(assault and battery), see e.g., Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949) and
Woodson v. Huey, 261 P.2d 199 (Okla. 1953); and a breach of duty to the patient
(malpractice or negligence), see e.g., Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924);
McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930).
Litigation on the issue of informed consent has also been based on theories of fraud
and deceit. A suit sounding in fraud requires proof that the physician actually knew
that what he told the patient was false or misleading, and acted so as to induce the
patient to consent. See Hedin v. Minneapolis Medical & Surgical Inst., 62 Minn. 146,
64 N.W. 158 (1895); and In Re Sherman v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 24 App. Div.
2d 315, 266 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1965), afj'd, 19 N.Y.2d 679, 278 N.Y.S.2d 870, 225 N.E.2d 559 (1967.)
Two of the leading cases are also among the earliest: Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.
Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) and Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960). Informed consent litigation is popular among dissatisfied
patients, and there have been parallel cases in most states. The volume ot legal con.
mentary also reflects the interest aroused in this doctrine. See note 4 supra.
65. The question before the court is framed in many ways: Was the patient "sufl-
dently" informed to give a valid consent? Did the physician withhold or distort
information which was "relevant" or "material"? Was the incomplete disclosure the
proximate cause of the patient's injury-that is, would he have refused treatment had he
been told everything? No matter how the question was framed, the rule has come to be
the same.
66. Within the past fifteen years, patients injured by medical procedure, but who had
consented to such and who could not raise the issue of specific medical malpractice,
began to question more frequently the validity of the consent they had given, as a sur.
rogate for ordinary medical malpractice suits stymied by the physician's professional
standard of care and the conspiracy of silence. Courts have held that the patient's right
to consent implied a further right to be informed, and imposed a corresponding duty on
physicians to inform their patients before seeking consent, except in emergencies.
In the last half of the fifties, the term "informed consent" arose largely as a result
of a series of malpractice suits in which the attorneys had great difficulty in proving
negligence and were forced to use another approach.
Statement by William J. Curran, DAEDALus PROCEEDING at 69, accord HARPER & JAMES
SurP. 68 § 17.1 n.15 at 58-59.
The conspiracy of silence has been discussed in Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied
-The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv. 250 (1956) and Note, Overcoming the
"Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common Law Innovations, 45 MINN. L. REV,
1019 (1961).
All hope of avoiding the conspiracy of silence was lost, however, when the majority of
jurisdictions applied the professional standard to informed consent litigation as well,
For example, the Missouri Supreme Court clarified its earlier decision in Mitchell v,
Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (1960) by stating:
We ... have concluded that the question of what disclosure of risks incident to
proposed treatment should be made in a particular situation involves medical judg-
ment and that expert testimony thereon should be required in malpractice cases
involving that issue . . .. The question is not what, regarding the risks Involved,
the juror would relate to the patient under the same or similar circumstances, or
even what a reasonable man would relate, but what a reasonable medical practitioner
would do.
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965).
The Kansas Supreme Court discussed its Natanson v. Kline decision in Williams v.
Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 8, 379 P.2d 292, 294 (1963). Most, if not all courts have come to
adopt the professional standard in establishing the physician's duty to disclose particular
information.
[C]ourts have generally ... required medical evidence that it is a local professional
practice to make the disclose in question before a jury may find a doctor negligent
in failing to make it....
HARPER & JA ,S SUPP. 68 § 17.1 n.15 at 60. Accord, Waltz and Scheuneman, supra note 4,
at 636; Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, supra note 4, at 786.
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Expert testimony is received to establish the standard of reason-
able professional conduct07 The defendant physician may establish
the standard himself or offer other witnesses. The burden actually
rests on the plaintiff to prove a standard of conduct and a breach of
that standard. Unless the plaintiff can produce his own expert wit-
nesses, the judge will direct a verdict in the defendant's favor.cs Only
if there is a substantial conflict among professionals will the question
of the proper standard of conduct get resolved by the jury0 9 as a pre-
lude to a determination about whether the particular behavior con-
formed to the standard. Most courts have refused to spell out any
specific definitions or requirements of disclosure as part of a more pre-
cise standard of care, and those courts which mention possible require-
ments do not insist on them in practice.70 Most legal commentators
67. The fact that expert testimony is required eliminates much of the confusion which
has arisen over the question of the proper legal theory to be applied in informed consent
cases-whether assault and battery or negligence. Several commentators and courts have
attempted to make meaningful distinctions between the groups of negligence and assault
and battery cases. See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 362, 409 P2d 74, 86(1965); Note, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatment: Battcry or Negli-
gence?, 34 S. CALIF. L. REv. 217 (1961); Plante, supra note 4. The formulation of the two
actions indeed differs in theory.
Several considerations are involved in the choice between the two theories of re-
covery: battery and negligence. On one hand, battery is based on the lack of a valid
consent to a touching; therefore, the main question for the jury is whether the plain-
tiff gave a valid consent. The term valid consent, when used in a batter
, 
action baed
on a failure to disclose, implies that the plaintiff voluntarily accepted medical treat-
ment after a reasonable disclosure of its essential nature. The physician's duty is to
disclose the nature of the touching before the patient consents.
On the other hand, an action for negligence is possible even though the patient
has given a valid consent. Therefore, the plaintiff must establish and the jury must
find the traditional elements of a negligence action. The jury's attention is focused
only upon the physician's failure to disclose collateral facts pertaining to a proposed
procedure or operation. It is in this area that the duty to inform becomes an inde-
pendent legal concept, since a physician should not, by his silence or misrepresenta-
tion, subject a patient to unreasonable risk of bodily harm.
Note, Failure to Inform as Medical Malpractice, supra note 4 at 767-68.
But as the courts require expert testimony to establish liability regardless of legal theory,
it makes little difference whether the doctor is sued for assault and battery or for negli-
gence (except perhaps with regard to the Statute of Limitations). The plaintiff carries
the same burden-to prove a professional standard and some deviation thererom. Courts
are now gravitating to exclusive use of the negligence theory in informed consent litiga-
tion. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. S. Ct. 1967).
68. See, e.g., Wilson v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965), aff'd 412 S.W.2d
299 (rex. S. Ct. 1967) and cases cited 412 S.W.2d 301-02. The Texas Supreme Court af-
firmed on the ground that the defendant's own testimony that it uas usual to tell patients,
and that he had told the plaintiff about a certain risk, established the professional standard.
The plaintiff had called the physician as an adverse witness.
69. Courts will "permit the jury to resolve conflicts of opinion among expert witneses
and come to their own conclusions about the proper standard of conduct." 2 IH'aR P -
JsArms, supra note 13, § 17.1 at 969.
The jury is allowed neither to substitute a standard of its own, see Johnston v. Brother,
190 Cal. App. 2d 464, 467 n.1, at 469, 12 Cal. Rptr. 23, 26 n.l (1961), nor in most cases,
to consider whether the professional standard is reasonable. Note, Informed Consent
in Medical Malpractice, supra note 4, at 1404 n.46.
70. Most informed consent cases raise questions of the risks inherent in certain proce.
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have voiced their agreement with the professional standard 71 and have
not advocated that courts adopt formal rules of disclosure.
The current law of informed consent, however, by placing the
right of the patient to be informed within the discretion of the med-
ical profession, critically undercuts the patient's right to consent. The
use of the professional standard bypasses an investigation into the ac-
tual importance the undisclosed information might have had for the
patient. Physicians are not asked to justify their standards of disclosure
with evidence from their experience in observing patients or with
a considered assessment of what the reasonable patient needs in gen-
eral to know. Instead, physicians rest on the conclusions that med-
ical information is incomprehensible to patients and that detailed
dures and the courts do not mention other possible topics of discussion, see, e.g., Watson
v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964) while others do suggest disclosure of alter-
natives, see Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W2d 186 (1958).
The most complete check-list was outlined by the Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson
v. Kline:
In considering the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain to the patient
in language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the
proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the
risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body, we do not
think the administration of such an obligation, by imposing liability for malprac-
tice if the treatment were administered without such explanation where explanation
could reasonably be made, presents any insurmountable obstacles.
186 Kan. 393, 410-11, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-7.
An important loophole in the physician's duty to disclose is recognized by all courts.
This is the doctor's "therapeutic privilege" to withhold information which he feelg wotld
be detrimental to the health of his patient. For discussion of how to dose this loophole
see pp. 1566-67 infra.
71. Comment, Valid Consent to Medical Treatment: Need the Patient Know?, supra
note 4, at 460, is the only article which suggests outright that a reasonable man standard
be applied, because the professional standard is "illogical."
Waltz and Scheneman, supra note 4, are ambiguous about the standard of care they
propose. They state that
The materiality of a risk must be determined in the first instance by the physician
m * Mhe issue should be approached from the physician's point of view.
Id:. a639.
They admit that the decision the physician must make is what would be material In-
formation for a reasonable patient, but go on to insert a physician's standard of knowing
what a reasonable patient would think was significant.
A risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the
risk or duster of risks in deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy.
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
Thus it is unclear whether expert testimony would set the standard of what the
physician "knows or should know."
The only other proposed standard which attempts to confront the problem of expert
testimony is found in Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, supra note 4,
at 1407. This proposal places the burden on the physicians to prove that a risk he failed
to disclose was immaterial. He could do so by offering expert testimony, much as he does
in current informed consent litigation. The plaintiff would not have to produce experts,
but he would have to overcome the weight of the defendant-physician's expert testimony.
It is submitted that shifting the burden of proof will not afford any greater frequency
of liability, or break the spell of expert testimony. Expert opinion must be made Ir-
relevant, through adoption of a reasonable patient standard of care. See p. 1561 infra.
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disclosures are time-consuming and purposeless. This general profes-
sional bias against more than a cursory disclosure 72 makes the physician
particularly unsuited to control the patient's right to know.
The decision about what is or is not relevant information upon
which a patient can base an informed consent is a human judgment,
not a determination requiring medical expertise. When the doctor
makes this decision, he does not deserve the special protection afforded
his professional activities by the professional standard of negligence.7 3
His lack of a sustained personal relationship with his patients deprives
the professional of any special ability to perceive a reasonable patient's
capacity or need to understand and evaluate a proposed intervention. 4
The doctor should be judged as an ordinary reasonable man.
In assessing whether the doctor acted reasonably, courts should
adopt a patient's, or layman's, standard of care. The jury would decide
whether the doctor disclosed enough information for the reasonable
patient to make an intelligent decision. The jury should not under-
take a subjective inquiry into what the individual patient actually
understood or whether he acted intelligently. Presumably the plaintiff
will present evidence regarding material facts that were not disclosed.
The jury's task is to determine whether the information actually with-
held would have been relevant for the jury members themselves, for
their judgment is by definition that of the reasonable patient. They
make this determination in the light of the knowledge about a given
procedure which is available to the medical profession.7 5 Thus whether
a piece of undisclosed information would have been relevant 70 for
72. See notes 37-38 supra.
73. See 2 I-HaRPE & JAMEs, supra note 13, § 17.1, at 969. The "tenderness accorded to
professional men (which may perhaps be attributed to the serious consequences to their
professional standing from a successful malpractice suit) has few analogies in modem
accident law."
The tenderness also reflects society's recognition of the "uncertainty factor" in all of
medicine. See note 40 supra. The consequences of the most routine and iell-performed
precedure are never certain, and a resulting injury which raises in dhe layman's mind
the inference of negligence may be entirely fortuitous. Society is not willing to make
doctors pay, in money and reputation, for the consequences of uncertainty.
74. See pp. 1546-51 supra.
75. Experts will be allowed to testify as to the available facts about specific procedures.
See p. 1561 infra.
76. The important question of how relevant or how important the information must
have been remains. Must the undisclosed fact be so important that it necessarily would
change the patient's decision? Or, may the fact be only important enough that it might
possibly have changed the patient's decision? Both inquiries stretch the capacity of ajury to determine relevance. A better rule would be: The information iwas of such
significance that it was probable (more likely than not) that it would have changed the
patient's decision. Jury members are capable of deciding for themselves the probability
that certain information would affect their decisions. Adoption of the "probability" stan-
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their own decision is the only question which the jury need resolve,
unless the doctor claims that the patient was for some reason "unrea-
sonable."7T If the jurors find the information irrelevant, the doctor
acted reasonably in withholding it. If they find it relevant, the doctor
acted unreasonably and will be held liable for failure to obtain in-
formed consent.78
It may be feared that adoption of the reasonable patient standard
will increase the volume of informed consent litigation and, thus, the
incidence of liability. Such short-term effects are likely whenever a
new cause of action is developed and lawyers have difficulty in pre-
dicting the outcome of litigation. Standards of relevance will gradually
be established by jury decisions; doctors will be able to make such
disclosures as the patient population believes is necessary. Litigation
may in fact decrease because a change in disclosure practices will
eliminate many of the angry and frustrated patients who instigate
malpractice suits.
Another argument against imposing stricter rules of disclosure
is that the doctor has no time to waste talking with patients. 0 Yet the
doctor is responsible for the health of his patient and the transmittal
of the requisite information is often necessary for proper treatment. In
addition, if more time were spent in preliminary discussion, the doctor
might eliminate subsequent difficulties with the patient and save him-
self time and a lawsuit. Moreover, patients in a teaching hospital are
treated mainly by interns and residents who are on duty around the
clock and whose main reason for not talking with patients is not lack
of time but lack of motivation.80 If the doctor has other compelling de-
mands, a surrogate paraprofessional should be made available to
dard will also avoid the extremes of excessive litigation (if the "possibility" standard were
adopted) and minimal litigation (if the "necessarily" standard were adopted).
77. See pp. 1564-71 infra.
78. Liability will result either in a malpractice-negligence action, or in an assault and
battery action. See note 89 infra.
79. The argument continues that doctors would then have more time to spend with
more patients, who really need them. See Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintif's
Medical Malpractice "Wonder Drug," 31 Mo. L. REV. 29 (1966).
This ignores the fact that doctors might not spend their free time seeing more patients,
and that the patients of private practitioners will continue to be able to buy their doctors'
time away from others.
80. See DurF & HOLLINGSHEAD at 13-34:
[I]nterest in the patient ... could not be sustained when there was so little in com-
mon between the providers and recipients of service and when the patient was In no
position to pay for the physician's time and hence make demands on him. Interest
in the disease, lack of interest in the patient, and difficulty in communication char.
acterized the ward accommodation ....
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discuss the patient's condition throughout his treatment, although
legal responsibility should not be avoided by such a practice.8'
B. Power to the Patient: Enforceable Rules of Disclosure
In addition to a different standard of care, the restructured law
of informed consent also should have at its center formal rules of dis-
closure stipulating the minimum amount of information that a rea-
sonable patient must be told before his consent is requested. The
doctor ought to initiate discussion with his patient on the following
substantive topics: the diagnosis; the physician's choice of treatment;
the physician's experience with this treatment; the methods to be used;
the risks involved, major and collateral; expected pain and discomfort;
the benefits of this treatment; alternatives to this treatment; prognosis.
Any omission from this list would constitute a prima facie violation
of the physician's duty to disclose and liability would ensue. The phy-
sician must at least mention basic facts within each category.8s2
Determinations about the relevance of collateral methods, risks,
pains or alternatives are within the province of the jury. Expert tes-
timony should be received only to inform the jury about specific
treatments. No inquiry should be permitted into the "practice" of pro-
fessionalss3 in disclosing these procedures. Under a restructured law of
informed consent, the job of the medical professional will be the job
of the traditional expert witness-to inform the jury about facts, not
to establish the rule which governs the interpretation of facts.8 '
These substantive requirements should not deter doctors from
expressing their uncertainties about the course of treatment. Doctors
should convey their uncertainties as clearly as possible, so that the
81. Presumably, if the doctor delegated responsibility to a paramedical staff member.
the suit could be brought against that person. Damages could be paid by personal
insurance. It is also possible that liability would be extended to the institution emplo)ing
the paramedical professional.
82. Courts have so far been unilling to stipulate a substantive rule of disclosure or
to define what must be told to obtain an informed consent. See note 70 ipra.
83. The opinions of professioinals as to what they believe patients need to know do
not qualify as expert testimony under the new reasonable patient standard. The defendant
may of course explain his conduct and argue for and against disclosures. He wilt not
be permitted to hide behind the conclusory statement "it is my professional opinion." The
inquiry must seek out facts and the jury must constantly be reminded that they can
judge the doctors as reasonable men. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978. 994-95
(1969), the Court stated about an expert's testimony about the issuance of drug warnings:
[T]he expert testimony of Dr. Hazel, to say the least, was subject to evaluation by
the trier of the facts. It might be given credit in part or given no credit. Accepting
the view that the "best method" should be employed, the trial court could reason-
ably find that "the most effective method" was the best method and therefore should
have been employed. . . .Dr. Hazel's testimony was not binding on the trial court
even if there had been no conflicting expert testimony.
84. 2 HAIRPER & JAMES, supra note 13, § 17.1, at 966-67.
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patient will not rely on vague probabilities as facts.8 5 It may be feared
that discussion of uncertainty will have a harmful effect on some pa-
tients. When harm seems inevitable, doctors may exercise their priv-
ilege not to disclose their doubts.8 6 It should also be noted that explicit
prior disclosures about difficulties may have beneficial effects on pa-
tients.87
In administering the substantive requirements, the court should
be prepared to look beyond pro forma compliance. At the request of
the plaintiffs, it should allow evidence that the patient was told in-
formation that apparently satisfied the requirements but was informed
in a manner which did not allow him to understand-and to question
-the analysis imparted by the doctor. The court could allow an in-
quiry into whether the doctor asked for questions from the patient
about what he had disclosed, and whether he indicated a willingness
to continue the discussion at the patient's request.88
The patient should also be allowed the right to waive the doctor's
compliance with the substantive requirements. But the law must
provide safeguards against the doctor's abuse of this waiver-an abuse
which would subvert the restructured law of informed consent. The
problem, of course, is how to determine whether the patient's waiver
is based on a genuine understanding that he is giving up his right to
be informed. Two safeguards should be required, at least. The doctor
should give an explicit statement indicating what the waiver entails
and that he is willing to continue the discussion, before he accepts the
waiver. A third party, preferably friend or relation, should also be
present to corroborate, in so far as possible, that the waiver was given
voluntarily and knowingly.
These reforms could be adopted and applied immediately as rules
of law in negligent malpractice or assault and battery litigation in
forums with no precedent.8s Jurisdictions with outstanding precedent
85. Statements of fact may be defined as those statements which are susceptible of
accurate knowledge, or those opinions which take on the weight of fact because of the
manner or circumstances in which they are presented. See Hedin v. Minneapolis Medital
& Surgical Inst., 62 Minn. 146, 148-49, 64 N.W. 158, 159.60 (1895).
86. See pp. 1564-71 infra.
87. See p. 1570 infra.
88. These "procedural" aspects of the decision-making process should be considered
guidelines for the physician, rather than rules from which he may not deviate. They
are meant to describe a process of disclosure which will maximize the possibilities for In-
formed decision.making by the patient. See note 112 infra.
89. In both actions, the plaintiff would have to prove that the physican failed to dlig
close information which was relevant to his decision to consent. The test of relevance
will be the same: whether such information would probably affect the decision of a
reasonable patient. The resulting tort may be found to be the negligent breach of duty
to the patient, or an unauthorized touching. Both wrongs will usually arise out of the
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would have to abandon the professional standard of negligence and
apply the reasonable patient standard, as well as adopt the proposed
substantive and procedural rules. Such changes would not be a radical
departure from existing policy; rather courts would be recognizing
that the law must create new rules to enforce fully the policy it has
long proclaimed.
If the patient sustains injury, the measure of damages should be
the same under both negligence and battery theories, determined by
the jury as in any injury suit. If no physical injury has been sustained
save for an unexpected, undesirable or unnecessary procedure or re-
sult, nominal damages should be awarded9 The doctor has committed
the same wrong, and the payment of nominal damages would serve a
disciplinary and possibly a deterrent function.
An action might also be brought against the doctor for deliberately
deceiving the patient, or misrepresenting the nature of the procedure.0'
Liability would depend on the "significance" of the information with-
held, and this determination would be based on the reasonable patient
standard. The inquiry of the jury would be the same as in a negligence
or assault and battery action. 92 Damages would be awarded, either
nominal or compensatory depending upon the harm suffered by the
patient.
same operative facts, and except for statute of limitations problems they both could be
argued, though some courts may prefer to hear one or the other.
90. Contra, Comment, Informed Consent as Medical Malpractice, supra note 4, at 1411.
This article argues that patients dissatisfied with results would be strongly inclined to
sue, and that these nuisance suits should be discouraged by extensive use of ph)sical
examinations under equivalents to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 and summary
judgments for physician-defendants.
But patients may have suffered financial or emotional damage by having to undergo
unnecessary, undesirable and unexpected procedures. Such injuries are difficult to prove
and assess. Heavy reliance on physical examinations and summary judgment might easily
defeat recovery. These wrongs, however, must be condemned in at least a nominal way.
Perhaps a full-blown court procedure is not the proper way to redress these grievances.
See p. 1564 infra.
91. An action for misrepresentation would not be possible unless courts adopt sub-
stantive rules of disclosure. Only a deviation from a positive duty to disclose can be
considered an active misrepresentation.
There are three types of misrepresentation: fraudulent, which requires proof of an
intent to deceive; negligent, which requires proof of negligence in preparing for the
disclosure or in actually communicating with the listener;, and innocent, which requires
proof only that the speaker substantially misrepresented the facts to the listener. In.
nocent misrepresentation, the theory akin to malpractice and assault and battery, cannot
be imposed without a spedfic duty on the part of the speaker to represent certain facts.
Since the physician's duty has been based only on the practice of his peers, courts have
been unwilling to impose a specific duty to discuss possible results (Robert v. Young,
369 Mich. 133, 119 N.V.2d 627 (1963)); or methods (Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153. 1,6
S.E.2d 617 (1964); Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d 306 (1966)). For a discussion of the law
of misrepresentation see F. Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty,
42 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1929) and S. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,
24 HARv. L. REy. 415 (1911).
92. See note 89, supra.
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A state legislature could codify the rules of disclosure and procedure
outlined above into rules of law to be enforced either by the courts,
by an administrative agency, or by committees of the medical profes-
sion itself. The legislature could fashion sanctions other than damages
for injury, such as fines, probation, loss of license or other adminis-
trative penalties, which could be imposed on a sliding scale, depending
on the gravity of the offense.93
Such changes would be a radical departure from the current inter-
nal and informal procedures which the medical profession employs
to regulate the conduct of its members. 94 It would be an interesting
experiment to allow county medical societies to hear and adjudge
complaints about disclosures and to allow them to fashion sanctions
both private and persuasive to their members. Administration by med-
ical professionals, outside the courtroom, would be the most desirable
form of controlling abusive practices. But the professional's tendency
to judge his colleague's conduct leniently militates against abdication
of all controls to the profession itself. The professional standard which
governs informed consent cases today might only be perpetuated. Thus,
whether the law is to be administered by courts or professional agen-
cies, laymen should be employed as the ultimate decision makers.
C. Reform of the Therapeutic Privilege
If laymen define what constitutes adequate disclosure for a reason-
able patient, the doctor defendant is very likely to raise, as a defense
to an alleged failure to disclose, the argument that particular patients
were "unreasonable" or should not have been told information which
might otherwise be relevant for a rational decision. Under existing
law, when the doctor has reason to believe the disclosure-such as the
serious risks of anesthesia or the diagnosis of cancer-is so disturbing
that it might cause the patient to forego the procedure or might in-
crease the factor of risk by inducing anxiety or psychological trauma,
he may exercise a "therapeutic privilege" to withhold the informa-
tion. 95
93. Such a system might avoid the expense, time and effect on reputation of courtroom
litigation. The interest of society lies in correcting the practices of physicians, not punishing
them or making sure their reputation is damaged. It is also not in the interest of society
to tie up its physicians in lengthy trials, years after the incident occurred. The volume of
informed consent litigation is not overwhelming and would not overburden a small ad.
ministrative staff.
94. See note 15 supra.
95. The formulation of this rule in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) is often cited:[rihe physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and this very
fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two alter-
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In a majority of jurisdictions, the doctor's discretion is upheld as
an exercise of medical expertise. 8 The doctor is judged according to
the professional standard of reasonable conduct; expert testimony is
received to establish that the defendant's peer physicians might exer-
cise their professional discretion to withhold information in a similar
case. Again, only if there is substantial conflict between professionals
is the question of the appropriate standard of care resolved by the
jury.9 7
The privilege, which allows doctors to withhold information and, in
effect, to manipulate their patients into consent, denies the patient the
right to say "no" to treatment.9 8 This abrogation of the right to par-
ticipate in decision-making should be permitted only when there is a
native courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon
any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in
alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result
refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result
in actually increasing the risks by reason of the ph)siological results of the appre-
hension itself. The other is to recognize that each patient represents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in
certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain
amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent.
It is not dear where this privilege originated. Waltz and Scheuneman, supra note 4, at
642 n.51, state that courts have adopted the therapeutic privilege almost as a matter
of judicial notice. They cite some medical references to the desirability of the privilege,
reflecting its source in medical argument. Id. at n.50. The Salgo court cites three cases
for authority, principally Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 523, 88 SE.2d 762, 766 (1955)
which itself states only that "it is understandable that the surgeon wanted to reassure
the patient so that he would not go to the operating room unduly apprehensive. Failure
to explain the risk involved, therefore, may be considered mistake," but not negligence
(emphasis supplied).
The court in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960), relied
upon the Salgo statement and several law review articles which had considered the sub-
ject. The Kansas court adopted the Salgo rule at 1105. One of these articles, McCord,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. Rnv. 549, 586, relies also on
Salgo. The authors of the two principal articles, Lund, The Doctor, The Patient and The
Truth, 19 TENN. L. R1v. 344 (1946) and Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Sped-
fic Diagnosis front Patients Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. RE. 349
(1946) emphasize that the doctor must do what is best for the patient. This argument
can be attacked on the ground that the doctor's complete discretion is not best for the
patient. See p. 1570 infra. "Such an important ingredient in a person's right to make up
his own mind should not be delegated by the courts to the customary local practice of
any profession" HARPER & JAMES Supp. 68, § 17.1 n.15 at 61.
96. [C]ourts have generally . . . required medical evidence that it is local pro-
fessional practice to make the disclosure in question before a jury may find a doctor
negligent in failing to make it.
HAa'rR & JA Es Srp'. 68, § 17.1 n.15, at 60.
97. See note 69 supra.
98. HA'rR & JAMES, SuPP. 68, § 17.1 n.15, at 61, make a strong statement about the
right to say no:
The very foundation of the doctrine (of informed consent] is every man's right to
forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him are intolerable consequences
or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of values may be in the eyes of the
medical profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion falls short
of what the law regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here is guaranteed only
if people are given the right to make choices which would generally be regarded as
foolish ones.
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clear showing that the patient's interest in not hearing is greater than
his interest in making his own decision. When such a balance exists,
the therapeutic privilege serves a valuable function and should be ex-
ercised. However, with an altered standard of care, pressure to invoke
the privilege may increase, and thus the law in the area should be
restructured to protect legitimate exercises of the privilege and to
eliminate its abuse.
Abuse is possible because the professional standard effectively al-
lows the medical profession full discretion in deciding that an exercise
of the privilege is legitimate. The experts are not required to justify
their practice in the specific case with data on the patient involved
or on their experience with the actual occurrence of the emotional
disturbance they so confidently predict. Nor are they even required to
give reasons for their predictions.99 The therapeutic privilege can
therefore be used to justify the withholding of information, no matter
how crucial, for reasons which may have nothing to do with the in-
terests of the patient. Available evidence indicates that physicians'
decisions to withhold information are based on hearsay rather than
on actual experience with the effects of full disclosure and that the
physician's own emotional reluctance to confront the patient with
stark diagnoses and risks often prevents disclosure.100
99. In Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 68 S.E.2d 762 (1955), no mention was made as
to why disclosure of risks might endanger the success of the operation. Watson v. Clutts,
262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964) placed the burden on the patient to ask about further
adverse risks if she desired to be further informed, with no mention of why Dr. Chutts
had not gone into them himself. Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P 2d 982 (1961)
refused to examine the reasons for the doctor's failure to disclose risks even after his
particularly insistent patient stated, "Doctor, when you start fooling with a man's eyes
it is the most precious thing he has. I want it sure. I'd rather continue the way I am
than to take any chances whatever."
The court in Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.E.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965) stated that:
[The reasonable] practitioner would consider the state of the patient's health, the
condition of his heart and nervous system, his mental state, and would take Into
account, among other things, whether the risks involved were mere remote possi-
bilities or something which occurred with some sort of frequency or regularity. This
determination involves medical judgment as to whether disclosure of possible risks
may have such an adverse effect on the patient as to jeopardize success of the proposed
therapy, no matter how expertly performed.
But no court has demanded that the physician prove his inquiry.
100. One study of what doctors tell cancer patients about their diagnosis, and why,
revealed that:
[O]nly 27 (14%) have had the opportunity for first-hand knowledge based on their
own trial of any policy different from their current one. More detailed exploration
in the interviews cast a great deal of further doubt about the role of experience. It
was the exception when a physician could report known examples of the unfavorable
consequences of an approach which differed from his own. It was more common to
get reports of instances in which different approaches had turned out satisfactorily.
Most of the instances in which unhappy results were reported to follow a different
policy turned out to be vague accounts from which no reliable inference could be
drawn.
Instead of logic and rational decision based on critical observation, what is found
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The law should be changed to deny doctors the right to exercise
the therapeutic privilege at their whim or convenience. Under the
current standard-what a reasonable doctor would do in like circum-
stances-expert physicians give content to the standard by adverting
to patterns of practice in the area; if the defendant doctor's behavior
conforms to that pattern, the verdict is directed for him. The law
should be changed so that there should be a jury determination
whether, on the basis of the data available to the defendant in the par-
ticular case, the exercise of the privilege was "reasonable." The jury
must answer the question: Was the doctor "reasonable" in deciding that
the patient was sufficiently unreasonable or incapacitated to justify
exercise of the therapeutic privilege and subsequent withholding of
information? Expert testimony will be received not to determine dis-
positive facts (the pattern of practice in such instances) or the content
of the standard, but as one factor for the jury members to consider in
deciding whether, given all the facts, a "reasonable doctor"101-as de-
termined by the jury itself-was justified in withholding the informa-
tion.
Admittedly, this determination is more difficult than deciding
whether the doctor acted "reasonably" under the new, "patientes stan-
dard of care." In the latter situation, the jury is placing itself in the
position of a patient-another layman--and deciding the relevance
of withheld information. As noted, the assessment of the doctor's rea-
sonableness is based on resolution of that question. In the therapeutic
privilege determination, however, the jury is being asked to examine
the conduct of a professional and to put itself in his place in deciding
whether invocation of the privilege was legitimate.
Difficult though the question may be, a jury of laymen should be
competent to decide what situations do justify the withholding of in-
is opinion, belief and conviction, heavily weighted with emotional justification. As
one internist said: "I can't give a good reason except that I've alias done it." ...
Personal convictions were stated flatly and dogmatically as if they were facts. Thus,
"Most people do not want to know." "It is my firm belief that they alwamys know
anyway," or "No one can be told without giving up and losing all hope." Highly
charged emotional terms and vivid expressions were the rule, indicating the nature
and intensity of feelings present. Knowledge of cancer is "a death tentence," "a
Buchenvald," and "torture."
Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients, 175 J.A.M.A. 1120 (1961). Another commentator has
noted that
Studies have revealed that physidans are afraid of death in greater proportion than
control groups of patients. This is a fascinating statistic, and, if true, it is likely
to reflect the doctor's perturbation and confusion in a situation reputed to be natural.
Aring, Intimations of Mortality, 69 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 137, 139 (1963).
101. Reference to the "reasonable doctor" should not lead courts to think that the
professional standard of care can be maintained. The jury judges him as a reasonable
man who practices medicine.
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formation. 0 2 In some instances they are already asked to make such
a determination. For example, doctors may raise the therapeutic priv-
ilege in cases of emergency. Juries decide now whether or not emer-
gency situations exist and whether they justify abrogation of the right
to consent.'0 3 The most typical situation will involve the "unreason-
able" patient cases in which specific past history or present diagnosis
indicates that disclosure of information will increase the patient's emo.
tional instability and anxiety. In these cases the doctor can claim that
disclosure would increase the medical risks or make rational decision.
making impossible. 04 The validity of such claims may be difficult, but
102. This suggestion is not supported by many legal commentators. Tie only outright
agreement for this proposal comes from HARER & JAMtEs SUP'. 68, § 17.1 n.15 at 60411.
These tort experts support the reasonable man (reasonable doctor) standard ont the
basis that its application is the only way to fully protect the individual's freedom of
choice. Comment, Valid Consent to Therapy: Need the Patient Know, supra note 1,
at 459-61, suggests the same. Some commentators have argued that the exercise of
the therapeutic privilege should be justified on a case by case basis, rather than by it
"customary standard" including an analysis of the condition of the individual patient
and perhaps the doctor's experience in these matters. See Froham, Vexing Problems in
Forensic Medicine: A Physician's View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1215 (1956); Waltz and Scheune-
man, supra note 4, at 643; Case Note, 75 Hv. L. Rlv. 1445 (1962).
Waltz and Scheuneman, however, continue to phrase the issue as one of "sound medical
judgment," supra note 4, at 643. If this is the issue, expert testimony will establi~t when
the individual has exercised sound medical judgment rather than leaving the question
to the jury. Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, supra note 4, at l1ll
would allow the defense of therapeutic privilege to be raised and expert testimony to be
admitted, if the burden of proof were on the physician, and he made a disclosure to
a responsible relative. This rule does not circumvent the problem that expert testimony
will then set the standard which a reasonable man cannot contradict. See discussion In
note 71 supra.
103. The "emergency exception" to the rule that information must be disclosed and
consent obtained applies to cases where the patient is unconscious or his condition Is too
critical to brook delay.
This exception was articulated by Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y,
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, "a surgeon who performs an operation without hIls
patient's consent, commits an assault . . . except in cases of emergency where the patient
is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent is obtaincd." Whenl
physicians assert this emergency exception in defense of their failure to obtain consent,
the outcome turns on the definition of "emergency" which the court will employ. If there
are serious risks for the patient if intervention is delayed, the doctor will argue that the
case qualified as an emergency and that immediate action was dictated as good medicalpractice.
In most jurisdictions, the reasonableness of the doctor's action in an emergency is
determined by the jury's perception of reasonableness rather than by the professlonal
standard of conduct. One commentator has argued that the professional standard should
be applied whenever the emergency exception is raised. See McCord, supra note 64, But
not every intervention may be in the patient's "best interests" just because medically It
may benefit him. The patient has other interests in learning about alternatives, or ob.
taining another doctor which also deserve protection. As long as the decision as to when
a case is an "emergency" is left with a jury of laymen, to whom these other interests are
meaningful, a reasonable balance of the patient's interests will be maintained. When the
patient's life and health are in serious danger, the jury is likely to afford the doctor wide
discretion to act. But if the patient has voiced objections to the procedure (see cases cited
in McCord, supra note 64, at 395-405) and in cases in which the risks of delay are legs
than drastic (see cases cited in Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. RLV.
189, 200-03 (1961)), juries often have not found the doctor's decision to proceed without
consent to be reasonable.
104. See note 95 supra.
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is not impossible, for the jury to determine. Juries are frequently called
upon to evaluate legal competency and a variety of insanity defenses
which involve state of mind. They can hear testimony on the patient's
emotional condition and on his past and present history in deciding
whether the defendant acted "reasonably" in predicting serious psycho-
logical effects. As noted, expert testimony about the challenged med-
ical practice will only be one factor for the jury members to consider
in deciding whether withholding information was legitimate.105
If the defendant-physician relies solely on his own professional judg-
ment and opinion to justify his decision, the jury can find this to be
sufficient or not. When it believes that the doctor was moved by rea-
sonable consideration of the patient's condition or interests, it can
uphold the exercise of the privilege. But, when it finds unreasonable
action-sham, whim or lack of consideration for the patient-in con-
junction with an actionable withholding of information, it can impose
liability for abuse of the privilege. Giving the jury a larger role in
determining a doctor's reasonable conduct regarding use of the thera-
peutic privilege may accentuate the trend towards the increased vol-
ume of informed consent litigation and the higher incidence of liability
which may initially follow a restructuring of informed consent law.
This result may, however, be shortlived. 100 The object of changing
the law is not to get doctors into court, but to get them to change
their practices. An initial increase in liability may be a necessary cost
of enforcing these changes. It is to be hoped that doctors, fearing the
jury's scrutiny, will generally reveal more information to their pa-
tients. Only when physicians are most confident of their ability to
justify withholding information should they invoke the therapeutic
privilege. For reasons discussed below, 107 this general shift to greater
disclosure should be beneficial in the context of modem medical prac-
105. For example, if expert psychiatric testimony is received to describe the emo-
tional state of the patient, it is relevant only if known to the defendant at the time of
his decision. The jury can ascribe whatever weight it wishes to such testimony-the
only rule being that the jury does not have to accept an expert determination as dis-
positive.Experiences of other physiians with the same disdosure problem will be admissible
only if the doctor in fact knew of these experiences at the time he made his deision.They will not be admitted to establish a professional standard of practice. The general
opinion of the medical profession about specific disclosures may have had some effect on
the doctor's evaluation and therefore is relevant to the case if the doctor -Inew about it.But the point should be made by plaintiff's counsel that this opinion is of little wightunless based on facts and experiences also known to the doctor. Some juries will be
swvayed by the weight of this professional opinion, others wsill judge the physidian solelyon the basis of his own experiences and the facts of the case.
105. See pp. 1560-61 supra.107. See pp. 1572-75 infra.
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tices. It has been specifically argued that thorough disclosure is the
best preparation for successful therapy. The patient who can anticipate
and worry about pain and discomfort is better able to cope with it
when it occurs. 108 His anxiety is diminished, and, instead of engaging
in destructive recriminations 0" about the doctor's care and skill, he
can concentrate on the task of getting well.
The same pattern may well obtain when the patient is told about
risks and potential complications. If and when they occur, the patient
may not lose faith in his physician. The prior preparation can be an
important factor in the patient's adjustment to failure, deformity or
serious injury. Thus, the current assumption of medical practice that
under-disclosure is always better for patients"0 is open to challenge
and should not necessarily impede acceptance of the restructured law.
The dangers of over-disclosure under the new standard cannot be
estimated with any precision."' Unquestionably, with the new stan-
dard of care and more careful jury scrutiny of the therapeutic privilege,
doctors will be forced to give more information to patients. The
potential injury to those patients who may receive information and be
adversely affected by it under a restructured law must be balanced
against the beneficial effect a new law can have on the known abuses,
in medical and human terms, which are caused by the present pattern
of medical practice. Although the potential harms cannot now be
estimated with any precision, these uncertain risks seem outweighed by
108. One study reported:
[1]t appears that those who were told practically nothing about the unpleasant
aspects of the operation beforehand were more inclined than the others to display
intense anger reactions on the day of the operation, to develop unfavorable attitudes
toward the surgeon, and to experience sustained emotional disturbances.
Provided that the material is not presented in a lurid or threatening manner, and
is accompanied by impressive reassuring comments, specific forecasts about futtre
stressful experiences can probably influence most persons to engage in an imaginative
mental rehearsal of the type that promotes the development of effective datnger-con-
tingent reassurances.
1. JANIS, PsYcHoLoGxeAL STR7sS 358, 568 (1958).
109. I was so mad at the doctor after the operation and after the anesthetic wore
off, I couldn't say anything except a few choice bits of profanity in a low voice ....
I was annoyed at the pain I experienced which he led ine to believe would be small
After the anesthetic, I was never given a sedative and the pain was extreme and
continued for days .... Now I know what to expect at the hands of an amateur.
Id. at 359.
110. In Ferrara v. Galuchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958), the patient was allowed
to recover for psychological injury caused by a doctor's warning that she might develop
cancer. This statement was made to induce her to stick to her therapy, and is a good
example of the warnings doctors will resort to, to gain cooperation. It is not evidence
that discussion of possible results, handled in a sensitive manner, will induce emotional
trauma.
111. See notes 37-38 supra.
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the known costs of current patterns and by the values of personal
autonomy contained in the promise (though not the practice) of the
current law of informed consent. In those cases where the patient can
reasonably waive his right to be informed, the option of allowing the
doctor to forego substantive disclosures is of course available to the
patient.
III. Towards a New Relationship
The proposed changes in the law seek to increase the potential for
informed, rational decision-making by both doctors and patients."
112. The acquisition of fully informed and rational consent for every therapeutic in-
tervention is an unobtainable goal. No man, let alone a worried and suffering patient,
is completely rational. The human mind is limited in its capacity for rationality, and
falls prey to many forms of internal and external pressures.
The process of reaching an "informed consent" was studied in a group of twenty kidney
transplant donors.
The medical selection system as described assumes that the future donor will make
his decision only at the conclusion of the medical work-up and after intensive and
repeated briefing. It is assumed that the decision will occur only at the end of
adequate information-gathering and weighing of the pros and cons. Actually.
members of the renal transplant team were aware that most of the poten-
tial donors were ready to make a commitment earlier than that and had
to be held off until the team had made its selection. It vas thought that
this point of commitment wras reached perhaps halfway through the evaluation
process. Our findings were surprising. Not one of the donors weighed alternatives
and rationally decided. Fourteen of the twenty donors and nine of the ten donors
waiting for surgery stated that they had made their decision immediately when the
subject of the kidney transplant was first mentioned over the telephone, "in a
split-second," "instantaneously," and "right amay." Five said they just went along
with the tests hoping it would be someone else. They could not recall ever really
having made a dear decision, yet they never considered refusing to go along either.
As it became dear to each of them toward the end of the selection proeos that he
was going to be the person most suited to be the donor, each had finally committed
himself to the act. However, this decision too occurred before the sessions with the
team doctors in which all the relevant information and statistics were put before
these individuals and they were finally asked to decide.
The fact remains that all the donors and potential donors interviewed by us reported
a decision-making process that was immediate and "irrational" and could not meet
the requirements adopted by the American Medical Association to be accepted as
an "informed consent." Actually, the medical renal transplant team did not permit
these donors to volunteer until a prolonged process of repeated information (or
indoctrination?) had been completed. The effectiveness of this procedure must, how-
ever, be questioned by the investigators, if for no other reason than that it did not
dissuade one single volunteer.
Feltner & Marshall, Kidney Donors-The Myth of Consent, 126 A.srn. J. Psvcn. 1245,
1247-48, 1250 (1970).
How should the medical and legal professions react to this data? As Paul Pl.amey
stated in his fourth Lyman Beecher lecture on medical ethics at Yale University in
April of 1969 (a copy of which is presently at the Yale Press):
It is possible to parody the consent-requirement by simply writing out all the details
and the possible consequences that would have to be transmitted in order for a
patient to be fully informed. If that is the meaning of informed consent, then major
operations that are quite ordinary might get few takers, or only be performed upon
patients who are frightened to death. Likewise, it is possible to analyze the motivations
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The reforms, by creating definite rules and procedures which doctors
should follow, seek to structure a relationship of shared decision-mak-
ing which can prevent serious abuses.
The changes in the law should increase the flow of information from
doctor to patient, but they should also have other effects, especially
if joined with medical reforms of a more informal nature. The re-
structured law should be an important stimulant to the development
of a partnership between doctor and patient which will increase the
possibility for more personalized medical decision-making and which
will provide a source of motivation for therapeutic teamwork. Al-
though the patient retains ultimate control over his own participation,
the doctor also retains control over his practice. The patient cannot
dictate to the professional what he shall do. It remains the doctor's
task to formulate professional opinions and to refuse to undertake
treatment of which he does not approve. Both parties must consent,lla
and both parties retain power to affect the course of the treatment.
The doctor and patient will form a relationship based on mutual part-
nership, rather than on the dominance and submission of either.
In a partnership relationship, the doctor and patient will assume
roles very different from the authoritarian parent-child pattern. This
new relationship has been described as follows:
Philosophically, this model is predicated on the postulate that
equality among human beings is desirable. . . . It is crucial to
this type of interaction that the participants (1) have approxi-
mately equal power, (2) be mutually interdependent (i.e. need
each other), and (3) engage in activity that will be in some ways
satisfying to both ....
This relationship, characterized by a high degree of empathy, has
elements often associated with the notions of friendship and part.
nership and the imparting of expert advice.. . . The physician's
gratification cannot stem from power or from control over some-
one else 114
of normal volunteers so as to cast total doubt upon the freedom of their choice.
But then one casts doubt as well upon most human decisions, such as the decision
to become a physician or a minister. Such an analysis does not resolve the problem
of seeking rational choice. Law and Medicine should seek to maximize rationality,
rather than bemoan its absence.
Id. at 4.
113. In therapy and in diagnostic or therapeutic invesigations, the common cause
is some benefit to the patient himself; but this is still a joint venture In which
both patient and physician can say and ideally should both say, "I cure."
Id. at 9.
114. Szasz & Hollender, supra note 6, at 587, 588. Ramsey discusscd this type of
relationship as follows:
Men's capacity to become joint adventurers in a common cause makes possible
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Such a relationship is preferred and fostered by some psychiatrists.1 5
The theoretical premises of the partnership relationshipuc for pro-
fessionals and clients are that professional problems often have no
single best answer, but involve open choices among alternatives;1 that
these problems are accessible to lay understanding with the advice of
experts;118 and that experts are not always capable of acting solely in
their clients' best interests.-u9 These premises directly contradict the
a consent to enter the relation of patient to physician or of subject to investigator.
This means that "partnership" is a better term than "contract" in conceptualizing
the relation between patient and physician or between subject and investigator. The
fact that these pairs of people are joint adventurers is evident from the fact that
consent is a continuing and a repeatable requirement. Wc can legitimately appeal
to permissions presumably granted by or implied in the original "contract" only to
the extent these are not incompatible with the demands of an ongoing partnership
sustained by an actual or implied present consent and terminable by any present or
future dissent from it. For this to be at all a human enterprise-a relation between
the man who performs these procedures and the man who is patient in them-
the latter must make a reasonably free and an adeluately informed consent. Ideally,
he must be constantly engaged in doing so. This is basic to the cooperative enter-
prise in which he is one partner.
Ramsey, supra note 112, at 8-9.
115. See note 59 supra.
116. See D. Rosenthal, supra note 12, for a more complete discussion of the literature
on professional-client relationships. He styles F. RODELL, OE UNro You LA.4wyEs (1957)
and F. CooK, THE PLOT AGAINST THE PATIENT (1967) as debunkers of the traditional model,
and J. CARriN, LAwYER's Ersucs (1966) as critic who offers no positive alternatives. There
has been no systematic presentation of the partnership alternative, perhaps until Rosen-
thal's writing. Some of the ideas infra were suggested and reinforced by his discussion
of the partnership model.
117. See note 40 supra.
118. In fact, the criticism asserts that experts deliberately complicate issues, or assert
their inability to communicate about them, in order to subjugate the layman.
With regard to all basic questions of individual and social life, with regard to psycho-
logical, economic, political, and moral problems, a great sector of our culture has
just one function-to befog the issues. One kind of smokescreen is the assertion
that the problems are too complicated for the average individual to grasp. On the
contrary it would seem that many of the basic issues of individual and social life
are very simple, so simple, in fact, that everyone should be expected to understand
them. To let them appear to be so enormously complicated that only a "specialist"
can understand them, and he only in his limited field, actually-and often inten-
tionally-tends to discourage people from trusting their own capacity to think about
those problems that really matter. The individual feels helplssly caught in a chaotic
mass of data and with pathetic patience waits until the specialists have found out
what to do and where to go. The result of this kind of influence is a twofold one: one
is a scepticism and cynicism towards everything which is said or printed, vhile the
other is a childish belief in anything that a person is told with authority. This
combination of cynicism and naivete is very typical of the modem individual. Its
essential result is to discourage him from doing his own thinking and deciding.
E. FRomm, EscAPE FROM Fp.EDO.r 249-50 (1941).
119. Doubts about the physician's ability to place his patient's interests above his own
have been raised (1) on philosophical grounds:
No man is good enough to cure another without his consent. This holds without
exception for medical practice. This is the negative premise of the contract between
physician and patient, even if it serves mainly to direct us to the positive pole,
to the need for a patient's partnership in his own cure . . . man's propensity to
overreach a joint adventurer even in a good cause makes consent necessary. This
has to be said even if it is also true that there can be no substitute for the wisdom
and moral integrity of the medical practitioner. That integrity still needs to be
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fundamental beliefs which underlie the authoritarian model of pro-
fessional-client relationships. 2 ' If these premises are accepted, the con.
clusion to be drawn is that active participation by the client in the
decision-making process will make the relationship work better. There
is no systematic proof for this conclusion, for no profession has adopted
or tested the effects of a partnership with clients; but it is clear that
many professionals are becoming interested in alternative relation-
ships.121
sustained in its setting in a system of medical "checks and balances" anchored ill tie
requirement of consent.
Ramsey, supra note 112, at 9-10;
(2) on psychological grounds by Thomas Szasz who states that the ideology of "help.
giving" is so strong that physicians may find themselves unknowingly obliged to help tile
sick, "committed to an unwritten social contract that may be quite burdensome for them."
Their resentment at this obligation, especially if the sick person is found to be a
malingerer, enforces the feeling that they are being blackmailed and is undoubtedly taken
out on the patient. See T. Szasz, supra note 3, at 187-88;
(3) on practical grounds:
([D]ecision-makers can) be led into irrational decisions by experts in two ways:
if for the preferences of his superior te expert surreptitiously substituted
a different set to be maximized; or, alternatively, if on a question in which
the committee member was less competent he substituted his judgment for the exert
analysis of the relative costs and gains of alternative techniques. Yet to keep tsese
types of judgment separate is difficult. The superior may not be able to artilculate
his preferences to the expert, and will find it even more difficult to articulate the points
at which one preference should give way to another. In government advisory com-
missions, for example, top leaders usually specify goals so vaguely that the experts
can and must load the policy proposals with their own private preferences,
Experts have their own axes to grind, and it is easy for them to rationalize
(e.g., at being in "the public interest') the substitution of their own goals for those
of their superiors.
R. DAHL 9- C. LINDBLONT, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELROE, 74 (1953).
120. See pp. 1535-37 supra. Complaints about the actions of experts are common.
Almost everyone who is not an expert in a field quickly sees the proverbial limitations
of the expert; that his superior knowledge of certain specialized kinds of repetitive
events does not usually fit well with the conditions of real life. For in real.life
decisions many different kinds of events are relevant to a rational judgment, yet
each kind of event may be the bailiwick of a different specialty-or none at all,
Successful administrators-tested by their capacity for maximizing the goals of the
organization-know that the judgment of experts must be overruled at many points,
not because the experts' body of factual propositions is wrong, but because it does
not apply closely enough to real life.
R. DAHiL & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 119, at 75.
121. Changes in the administration of patients in a psychiatric hospital were studled
to see how patients responded to being given more authority over their fate. The authors
concluded:
This shift was prompted both by convincing demonstrations of the beneficial effects
of patients participating actively with staff in determining and assessing what happens
in the hospital and by conflicts of conscience among those exercising power, the doctors,
who knew, but had not previously been forced to acknowledge, the necessity of ex.
tending throughout the patient'l expeiience the dignity, respect, responsibility, auton-
omy, and self-determination long acknowledged as central to psychoanalytic treat.
ment. . . . [P]atients respond competently and responsibly to such opportunitiei
and expectations; in such an atmosphere they assert their dissatisfaction with being
the passive recipidnts of the ministrations of others. That fact renders the doctor's
authoritarian position uncertain and conflictful. He cannot continue to violate the
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The effects of establishing a partnership between doctor and patient
can be briefly recapitulated. Increased communication may bring out
important information which may affect the patient's diagnosis and
treatment. The patient's contribution to the actual medical decision-
making should also help to make possible more personalized choices
of treatment from among the alternatives offered by scientific medi-
cine. The spirit of teamwork will stimulate tie patient's motivation
to accept the tasks of treatment and to want to get well.
The difficulties in practicing a partnership must be recognized. A
thorough dialogue may be extremely time-consuming and burdensome
for doctors. It may also be more confusing than helpful for some pa-
tients; or, worse, it may raise their anxiety to injurious levels. The
beneficial aspects of disclosure can be completely undermined by hos-
tile medical practitioners who follow the letter of the law, but not the
spirit.
These difficulties are real, but they can be mitigated. An active part-
nership role should not be forced on any patient. The law of informed
consent must honor the decision of the patient to rely solely on the
doctor's discretion.122 If physicians with demanding technical and re-
search activities and interests do not wish to participate fully in the
partnership, paramedical personnel must be trained and qualified to
take their place. These individuals must obtain consent and continue
to relate to the patient once treatment has been administered.m! They
canons of shared power and fufill his obligations as a physician, for these deviations
from democratic practice are no longer justifiable on therapeutic grounds.
R. RUBENSTrIN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 3, at 6.
A study by Douglas Rosenthal of the relative successes of clients in accdent claims
indicates that the active participation of clients can lead to better results:
[]f client activity does influence case result, we should expect to find a statistically
significant rank order correlation between the two variables (client participation and
case result]. I have used Kendall's Tau to determine the rank order correlation for
the 43 cases where the mean panel evaluation is acceptable and find a moderately
strong positive relationship: contrary to the expectation from the traditional pro-
fessional model, active clients not only do not get worse results, but actually get
better recoveries from their legal claims.
But this is only the first step in casting doubt on the traditional hypothesis. It may
well be expected that client activity only masks some deeper more important ex-
planation of good case outcome. In fact, there are three additional factors which
might be thought to have a significant causal impact on case outcome. These factors
are the social status of the client, the dollar worth of the claim, and the "perfection"
of the liability issue in the claim.
There is a statistical procedure for performing a partial correlation of client
activity with case result, controlling for each of these three alternative iariables
one at a time. If client activity is not a valid independent causal variable, the cor-
relation should "wash out." Computation of the partial Kendall correlation reweals
that client activity is indeed a potent explanatory factor. At the level of aggregate
analysis, active client participation definitely pays off....
Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 48-64.
122. See p. 1562 supra.
123. The increasing use of trained personnel to take over the routine work of ph~si-
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could be legally responsible under a restructured law.124 Changing the
attitudes of physicians is also crucial. Medical education must instill in
students a willingness to trust the patient rather than a need to control
him.
In the end, the difficulties of the partnership must be balanced
against its potential benefits and the current injurious effects of au-
thoritarian medicine in a depersonalized context. For the unconvinced,
evidence must come from practitioners who have experimented and
advocate the acceptance of the patient as a partner. The role of the law
in this relationship is limited, but critical. The restructured rules of
informed consent can protect basic patient interests while pointing the
way toward new doctor-patient relations, in which legal sanctions should
be invoked only on rare occasions.
cians, plus the potential impact of computer therapy on the doctor's practice, mean that
doctors may in fact have more free time than at present to pursue their research Interests or
to pursue knowledge of the patient.
The major consequence, indeed the avowed aim of computer therapy in any form
will be to reduce the routine work of patient care done by doctors. Other elements
of that care are already disappearing; nurses have taken over several of these, and
technicians have taken over others. Thus, during the week, the MGH has routine
blood samples drawn by technicians and routine intravenous maintenance-starting
IV lines and keeping them running-done by specially trained IV nurses, Theseprograms were quite radical a few years ago, when doctors thought nurses constitu-
tionaly incapable of dealing with intravenous lines or drawing blood from a vein
But a startling consequence of this new specialization of non.physician health per-
sonnel has been better-care, in certain areas, than the physician himself could deliver.Eve  if doctors don't believe this, the patients know it well. On weekends, when
the IV nurses and the blood technicians are off duty, the patients complain bitterlyat the phy icians are n t as skilled in these tasks.
As for the special skills still reserved to physicians, such as lumbar pwturcs
and thoracic and abdominal taps, it is only a matter of time before someone discoversthat these, too, can be effectively delegated to other personnel.
It would thus appear that all the functions of a doctor are being taken over either
by other people or by machines. What will be left to the doctor of the future?
Almost certainly he will begin to move in one of two directions. The first is dearlytoward full-time research. The last fifteen years have seen a striking increase In the
number of hospital-based physicians and the number of doctors conducting research
in governmental agencies. This trend will almost surely continue.
A second direction will be away from science towr ar eart" of medicine-the
complex, very human problems of helping people adust to disease protesses? for
there will always be a gap between the illnesses medicine faces and sctene's lllta.
tions in treating them. And there wil always be a need for people to bridge that gap.
CRICHTON at 151-52.
124. See note 81 supra.
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